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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between water management institutions and local water 
conflict and cooperation. Both formal and customary institutions are analysed and the study 
builds on qualitative fieldwork from two villages in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania. The thesis 
analyses both water conflict and cooperation in relation to three user groups: Irrigation farmers, 
pastoralists and domestic users.  
 
Conflicts related to irrigation farming occur between upstream and downstream farmers when 
the upstream farmers are (perceived as) using too much water. The pastoralists conflict with one 
another over the use of wells for the cattle. The domestic users experience disputes when a 
women fails to wait for her turn when getting water from the wells, the riverbed or the taps. In 
addition, there are conflicts between pastoralists and domestic users when the pastoralists take 
their cattle to the wells used by domestic users.  
 
 
The large majority of the conflicts are solved between the actors. If deemed necessary, the 
offender pays a fine to the victim or reconstructs the well, in the cases where a well has suffered 
damage. The next step is to involve some authority e.g. a secretary from an irrigation group or a 
pastoralist group, or a village government representative. The third step is to have the matter 
discussed at the village council, which according to the respondents is seldom needed. A fourth 
option would be to address the formal water basin office. However, in the two case villages this 
option is generally not used because they manage to solve the conflicts without involving outside 
authorities. 
 
A network of formal water management institutions has been elaborated through the recent years 
however the villagers in the two case villages use none of these formal organs. Instead they use 
the various customary and formal institutions existing in the village. The highest ranking of these 
institutions is the village council; this institution is mainly used for conflict resolution. The 
village council is a formal institution but deeply rooted in the local societies. Another institution, 
which is both of a formal and customary nature, is the ‘water user association’. The irrigation 
groups have a long history in Tanzania, but with the implementation of the water rights and 
water fees, the groups are gradually being formally registered as water user associations. The 
irrigation groups/water user associations are in charge of all maters concerning irrigation farming 
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and during periods of scarcity they make water rotations so all farmers get water for the same 
amount of days. The implementation of the water rights and fees carried out in the 1980’ties 
implies that everyone using water for productive purposes must have a water right and pay a fee 
according to the amount of water used. The villagers are very discontent with the implementation 
of the water fee and find it unreasonable that the government is charging them for water since 
water has always been free according to customary laws. Furthermore, they claim to be unaware 
of the restrictions on the amount of water they are allowed to extract. The third institution is the 
pastoralist groups. The key motive for joining a pastoralist group is improved access to medicine 
for the cattle. In addition, the representatives from the groups may aid conflict resolution and the 
members are saving up for a water reservoir for the cattle. The complex of norms of behaviour 
regarding domestic water management makes up a fourth type of institution. The institution is 
invisible but highly important because it regulates water management for household use. Waiting 
for one’s turn is a crucial element in this institution, as well as keeping to the maximum limits of 
water extraction.  
 
Common for these institutions is that they are created by the actions, knowledge and norms of 
the actors. The rules and do’s and don’ts make up the institutions, which on the other hand serve 
to regulate the behaviour of the actors. The actors are heterogeneous and have different interests, 
but the customary institutions are largely connected to separate user groups and the rules of these 
do not conflict with the rules and practices of other groups. However the actors within the groups 
are not homogenous either and biases may prevail within the institutions. 
 
Overall, I find that the customary institutions are successful in solving and preventing conflicts. 
Because they are rooted in the local society and shaped by the actors they correspond well to the 
local water situation. Moreover, they are flexible and capable of adjusting to ecological 
uncertainties. The norms of behaviour are key to the customary institutions and in spite of 
occasional opportunistic behaviour they guide the actions of the users.  
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
During the recent years, water scarcity has become a topic of highest interest, figuring every day 
in the media, on the agenda of the politicians and in the mind of the public. There is a rising 
concern about freshwater and how to meet our needs and requirements in a world of a growing 
population. Many places in the world already suffer from shortage of water and there is a 
worldwide anxiety as to what the future consequences of climate change and increased 
consumption will be. At present, water consumption on a global scale doubles every twenty 
years, and in many countries demand is growing faster than supply. This holds true especially in 
developing countries in arid and semi-arid regions of the South, where water is relatively scarce 
and population growth rates are relatively high (Böge 2003:4). Human population growth and 
the expansion of economic activities are collectively placing huge demands on coastal and 
freshwater ecosystems. Water withdrawals, for instance, have increased six fold since the 1900s, 
which is twice the rate of population growth (UN 2006). 
 
Water is an essential life-sustaining element. We need water to secure our food supply and we 
rely on safe water to steer clear of diseases. Economic development requires energy resources 
and industrial activities, and both are in turn water-dependent (UN 2006:V). In other words, all 
dimensions of an extended security concept (food security, economic security and human 
security at large) depend on water. This crucial importance of water in every part of the world 
makes it an essential component of international, national and local security (Böge 2006:4) and 
in the recognition of this there is an increasing focus on water as a source of conflict (DIIS 
2006:1). 
 
Particularly the threat of international water conflicts has been the centre of attention. Nearly half 
of the world’s population live in shared river basins and the activity by one riparian may impact 
other riparians. Furthermore, many states are dependent on water resources generated outside 
their territories. It is thus easy to imagine the number of potential international conflicts (Böge 
2006:4).  
“Put all of these characteristics together – international water as a critical, nonsubstitutable 
resource, which flows across time and space, for which legal principles are vague and 
contradictory and which is becoming relatively more scarce with every quantum of growth in 
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population or standard of living – and one finds a compelling argument that, in the words of 
World Bank vice-president Ismail Serageldin, “the wars of the next century will be about water” 
(New York Times, 10 August 1995 in Wolf 1998:253).  
 
However, it is also argued that international water wars never have taken place and the 
possibilities that such wars ever will happen are diminutive (Wolf 1998:262). Although this is 
not to say that there are no international tensions with regard to water (Böge 2003:6).  
 
Though international water wars may be a myth, the connection between water and political 
stability is certainly not. The lack of clean freshwater supply clearly does lead to instability, 
which in turn can create an environment more conducive to political or even military conflict. 
Therefore, there is in fact a history of water-related conflict, but it is a history of incidents at the 
sub-national level, generally between ethnic, religious, or tribal groups, water-use sectors, or 
states/provinces (Böge 2003:7). 
“So, while no water wars have occurred, there is ample evidence that the lack of clean 
freshwater has lead to occasionally intense political instability and that, on a small scale, acute 
violence can result. What we seem to be finding, in fact, is that geographic scale and intensity of 
conflict are inversely related“(Wolf 1998:255). 
 
However, little research has been carried out concerning the relationship between water scarcity 
and conflict on local level and even less concerning cooperation as an outcome of water scarcity. 
Conflicts tend to be more spectacular and thus easier to identify than events of cooperation. Yet 
focusing merely on conflicts and excluding cooperative events will severely question any 
conclusions about causality between competition for water and the likelihood of conflict. The 
lack of better insight into water related conflict and cooperation limits the ability of governments 
and donors to elaborate water policies and projects that are consistent with the reality of the 
water users (DIIS 2006:1,3).  
 
Based on academic literature, the international media as well as own personal experience I have 
developed a curiosity as to whether water scarcity on local level leads to conflict or cooperation. 
By researching literature on this topic and carrying out my own fieldwork, I soon discovered that 
it leads to both conflict and cooperation and my curiosity developed into inquisitiveness for the 
factors influencing the outcome. It is not the purpose of this thesis to investigate the quantitative 
aspects of water scarcity related to conflict and cooperation, as this would require an extensive, 
systematic research. Rather, is it my aim to explore how the local context determines the 
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outcome. Many context specific conditions may be found to be decisive for the social outcomes 
of water scarcity, commonly mentioned are population growth, (Malthus 1798, Hauge and 
Ellingsen 1998) poverty (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2005) and institutional capacity (Ostrom 
2006, Wolf 2002, Mehta et al.1999).  
 
The importance of institutional capacity has gained increasing focus in the last decade and it is 
widely recognised that institutions play a key role in preventing and mitigating conflict (Wolf, 
Stahl and Macomber 2003:2).  
“ Thus, institutional capacity together with shared interests and human creativity seem to diffuse 
water’s conflict-inducing characteristics, suggesting that an important lesson of international 
water is that as a resource it tends to induce cooperation, and incite violence only in the 
exception”. (Wolf et al. 2003:3)    
 
The importance of institutions is likewise emphasised on the local level and it is suggested that 
customary water management arrangements are still highly influential in the local context. 
However, they often conflict with the statal, formal water management and thus add further 
conflict potential to already difficult circumstances (Böge 2006:31-33). I too found institutions, 
in the broadest sense of the word, to be crucially relevant in my study area, and therefore this 
thesis aims to study the significance of customary and formal institutions in relation to local 
water management and the events of conflicts and cooperation related hereto. I must emphasize 
that this thesis deals with water related conflicts, not wars.  
 
1.1 Problem field 
The majority of the world’s poorest and most underdeveloped countries are found in Africa, and 
it seems to be the place where drought and water stress is most prominent (Thomasson 2004:4). 
In the sub-Saharan countries, 83% of the urban population has access to improved water sources 
while the number is only 46% for the rural population (UN 2006:331). However, particularly in 
rural areas the relationship between poverty and water reaches far beyond the lack of access to 
drinking water. Secure access to water for productive purposes, e.g. irrigation and water 
retention for crop production, watering of animals, and ecosystem protection to ensure fish and 
grazing availability constitute a significant part of the livelihood of the rural poor (DIIS 2006:2). 
This thesis will therefore explore freshwater scarcity in relation to water for productive use as 
well as for domestic use.  
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It may be argued that the problem in Tanzania, as in many other sub-Saharan countries, is not so 
much the scarcity of water as the variability and unpredictably over season and years (van 
Koppen et al. 2004:3). In fact, there is an estimated 50% of all annual surface run-off flowing 
into the Indian Ocean and the large lakes while growing demands intensify water scarcity in the 
dry season. However, Tanzania lacks the economic resources to harness water and to overcome 
the extreme temporal and spatial variability in rainfall and surface flow (van Koppen et al. 
2004:vii,4). Of the urban population 90% has access to improved water sources, while the 
number is only 57% for the rural population (UN 2006:331). One of the key reasons for the 
existing problems is the failure to recognize the persisting dichotomy of formal and informal 
socio-economic and political spheres and the accompanying legal systems in Tanzania. The 
formal spheres and their legal systems were initiated by colonial settlers and pursued and 
adapted by the government after independence. The formal laws suited the needs of the urban-
based and industrial users, however they were inappropriate for the rural and still urbanizing 
migrant population, who are typically small-scale water users. In many cases among the latter, 
effective informal local water tenure systems exist which are often rooted in the tribal structures 
of pre-independent Tanzania (van Koppen et al. 2004:2). 
 
The pluralism of water law is common in many African countries as each of these types of laws 
– state, customary, and religious – may themselves be plural. Many communities have different 
ethnic groups living side-by-side using the same water, but having different traditions for its use. 
In particular, many places have farmers and pastoral groups, with different approaches to of life 
and water. The mix of religions adds to this plurality (Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005:2). 
Tanzania has a pluralistic legal system and hence land and water resources are regulated by 
different pieces of legislation and institutions, including statutory law, customary laws of the 
120-plus ethnic groups, Islamic law etc. However, whenever there is water scarcity and 
competition over water, the authorities pretend that the only prevailing law is state law (Maganga 
et al. 2004:1). 
 
As empirical material I use two villages from the Usangu Plains, situated in the Rufiji Basin, the 
largest of nine river basins in Tanzania. Various water uses co-exist in the basin, including 
domestic and livestock water supply, irrigation, hydropower generation, fishing and wildlife 
water supply (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:2).  
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1.2 Research question 
Given the above background, this thesis aims to explore the relationship between water scarcity 
and conflict and cooperation on a local level employing two villages in the Usangu Plains as 
cases. I analyse the relationship between institutions, both formal and customary, and water 
conflict and cooperation, furthermore, I study the nature of both water related conflict and 
cooperation in order to contribute to an understanding of these. Therefore my research question 
is: 
How is the relationship between water management institutions and local water conflict and 
cooperation?  
 
By institutions I refer to both formal and customary water management institutions and the study 
is exemplified by research from Mawindi and Isunura villages, Usangu Plains, Tanzania. In 
order to answer my research question, I have elaborated a number of guiding questions for the 
theoretical part and the analytical part. The questions for the theoretical part is placed in chapter 
2.7 ‘Theoretical Framework’ and the questions for the analytical part are to be found in chapter 
7.4 ‘Sub-conclusion’.  
 
In view of future increasing water scarcity, the present study is significant in that it sheds light 
on how local societies cope with water scarcity in relation to conflict and cooperation. By 
analysing the nature of local water related conflict and cooperation the thesis adds to the existing 
knowledge in this area, thus improving the basis for making sound and appropriate water 
management initiatives. Furthermore, the thesis studies the role of institutions as well as the 
customary and formal laws. By combining theories concerning natural resource management 
institutions in general, with studies dealing particularly with water management, the thesis 
contributes to the understanding of the complexity regarding institutions in local water 
management.  
  
1.3 Delimitation 
As mentioned, this thesis relies largely on the empirical study of two small Tanzanian villages. 
The micro perspective implies that other interesting events of conflicts and cooperation have 
been excluded and I am thus not capable of making any assumptions about conflict and 
cooperation above village level. However, I found that due to the limited frame of the thesis, 
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applying a narrow focus was more adequate than spreading over too much. Even on the local 
level, I have omitted to include a number of relevant issues e.g. an examination of customary and 
formal laws applied in court. This is partly due to the limited timeframe and partly due to the fact 
that water conflicts in the case villages, according to my knowledge, are not solved in courts. 
The study of customary laws often involves focusing on the laws of different ethnic groups, 
however in the two case villages, I found that there was no distinction between the laws of the 
different ethnicities. Another issue relevant for institutions in relation to conflict and cooperation 
is the matter of power relationships. The empirical information collected does not shed sufficient 
light on this, and therefore the analysis of power relationships and biases relies mainly on 
secondary information.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into five parts. The first part (chapter 1-2) contains the introduction and 
outlines the methodological aspects of the thesis. This gives the reader an overview of the 
background for selecting the various notions constituting the theoretical framework as well as the 
methods applied behind the empirical findings. Part two (chapter 3-7) presents the theoretical 
framework. Through a clarification and discussion of the theoretical notions I create a foundation 
for the analysis of the empirical information. Part three (chapter 8-10) describes the national and 
local context as well as the formal institutional framework. The analysis takes place in part four 
(chapter 11-12) where I on the basis of the theoretical understanding investigate the role of 
institutions in relation to water conflicts and cooperation in the specific context by analysing my 
own empirical findings as well as applying secondary empirical research. Part five consist of the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Methodological reflections 
  
In this part of the thesis, I explain the methodological considerations connected to the work of 
the thesis. I begin by clarifying my scientific approach and I then proceed to a description of the 
case study approach. In continuation of the general methodological considerations about case 
studies I describe the specific reflections related to my fieldwork. A brief review of the literature 
and authors applied then follows. Finally, I explain the creation of my theoretical framework.  
 
 
2.1 The scientific approach 
Theories can be used in various ways, e.g. one can aim to test theories though observation and 
experimentation, or one may seek to develop theories through a deductive approach, or as in this 
case the goal is to make use of the explanatory power of theory (van Evera 1997).  
“Theories are general statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of 
phenomena. They are composed of casual laws or hypotheses, explanations, and antecedent 
conditions” (van Evera 1997:7-8). 
 
Based on the above understanding of theories, I use my theoretical framework as a background 
for investigating the role of institutions in water management (I elaborate on the construction of 
the theoretical framework later in this chapter). The empirical framework consist of my own and 
other’s empirical findings on the subject of water conflict and cooperation. Thus, the inductive 
research methodology lays the ground for an analytical discussion and explanation of the 
relationship between institutions and conflict/cooperation, both in relation to the specific local 
context and to a lesser extent, on a more general level.  
 
2.2 Case study approach 
A case study may be described as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003:13). Various ways of classifying case studies can 
be found. One of them is the distinction between intrinsic, instrumental, and collective case 
studies (Stake 2000:437). 
Intrinsic case studies are undertaken because the researcher wants a better 
understanding of the specific case. The goal is not to represent other cases or to 
illustrate a particular trait or problem, but to give an account of the case because it 
in all its particularity as well as ordinariness is of interest.  
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Instrumental case studies aim to examine a particular case in order to provide 
insight into an issue or to redraw a generalisation. The case itself is of secondary 
interest, but it plays a supportive role and facilitates the understanding about 
something else. The case may be seen as typical of other cases or not.  
 
Collective case studies consist of the instrumental study of several cases. The 
individual cases may or may not be known in advance to manifest some common 
characteristic. They may be similar or dissimilar and are chosen because it is 
believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, perhaps better 
theorizing about a still lager collection of cases (Stake 2000:437). 
 
While acknowledging that not all reports fit neatly into such categories, I have chosen to include 
this categorisation, to make the purpose of my case studies clear. The motivation for undertaking 
fieldwork was created by the lack of literature examining the role of institutions in relation to 
both water conflict and cooperation on local level. Consequently, my aim is to explain how 
institutions affect water conflict and cooperation. This study is therefore a collective case study 
drawing on the instrumental study of two case villages in order to facilitate the understanding 
about water conflicts and cooperation in a wider perspective. In other words, the nature of the 
case study is ‘explanatory’ focusing on how and why questions (Yin 2003:6). 
 
It will be apparent throughout the thesis that the two case villages share certain similarities but 
also differentiate themselves from one another in some aspects. Another option could have been 
to use the individual events of conflict and cooperation as cases, however I found that choosing 
two villages as cases instead of specific events helped to enhance the comprehension of the 
importance of the local context. At the outset, I expected that choosing two villages with 
dissimilar water situations would reveal different situations of conflict and cooperation, and the 
purpose of selecting two cases representing two different water situations was to compare how 
the water situation affects events of conflict and cooperation. Instead, I found the prevalence of 
conflict and cooperation to be very similar in the two villages. Therefore, I only distinguish 
between the findings from the two villages when relevant.  
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2.3 Generalizability 
As stated above the ideal of this study is to provide an idea of the role of institutions in relation 
to water conflict and cooperation. Nevertheless, a common criticism of case studies is that the 
case study results cannot be generalized to other cases and that a single case is a poor laboratory 
for identifying a theory’s antecedent conditions (van Evera 1997:53). In addition, it is claimed 
that case studies are subjective, giving too much scope for the researcher’s own interpretations 
and that the validity of case studies is limited (Flyvbjerg 2006:219). However, on the other hand 
it is argued that investigations performed with case studies are strong because the predictions 
tested are quite unique; predictions that are not made by other know theories (van Evera 
1997:54). Additionally, the Danish urban geographer Bent Flyvbjerg states that the case study 
has “the force of example”.  
“One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to 
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But 
formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force of 
example” is underestimated” (Flyvbjerg 2006:228). 
 
Furthermore, I find the distinction between doing a ‘generalizing’ not a ‘particularizing’ 
imperative in understanding the significance of case studies. 
 “... case studies, like experiments are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a “sample” and 
the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to 
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization”) (Yin 2003:10). 
 
One way of obliging to the criticism of the case study approach could be to undertake a 
triangulation, by applying various methods e.g. to combine a qualitative approach with a 
quantitative approach. However, this has not been feasible within the limited timeframe of this 
thesis. At any rate, I find the force of the example to be of higher value in this context than a 
statistical generalization. Furthermore, my empirical findings are supported by the fact that I 
investigate two empirical cases, rather than a single case, and by applying secondary empirical 
knowledge where relevant.    
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2.4 Empirical reflections 
 
 
2.4.1 Time frame 
My fieldwork in Tanzania was scheduled to take place from mid-October to mid-December 
2007. However, due to unexpected delays of my research permit, I was not able to begin the 
fieldwork in the villages until November 12
th
. As a consequence of the delay, I had less time in 
the villages and less time to reflect and analyse the data collection during my stay. I was in the 
Usangu Plains during the dry season, which made it easier for me to observe the water scarcity 
for domestic use as well as for pastoral farming. However, as the agricultural farming only take 
place in the wet season, I was not able to make any personal observations in relation to this. 
Furthermore, being there in the dry season may have affected the perceptions of the villagers 
concerning the severity of the water scarcity. The fieldtrips took place in two periods of 12 days.  
 
2.4.2 Local cooperation 
When carrying out fieldwork in Tanzania some sort of local/national cooperation is necessary in 
order to achieve the needed permits. In my case, I was fortunate to have Faustin Maganga from 
University of Dar es Salaam to vouch for me. In addition to assisting me in obtaining my 
research permit, he put me in contact with John Paul Gwmile who kindly lent me his house in 
Rujewa and arranged for me to meet with Stephen Ndwenya, who became my local facilitator. 
Mr. Ndwenya helped me with all sorts of practical matters and was an important link between 
the villagers and me due to the respect and acknowledgement he enjoyed in the villages. People 
seemed to welcome my presence largely because he accompanied me, however his presence may 
also have served as a constraint concerning the openness of the villagers. Naturally, I cannot say 
whether the informants held back information that would otherwise have been given to me in his 
absence. Overall, I found his support and presence to be of crucial importance both in relation to 
the villagers in general and in relation to the village authorities. In addition, he appointed me 
with my translator, Medrack Puye who translated all interviews for me during my two fieldtrips.  
 
2.4.3 Selection of the case villages 
During the two fieldtrips I lived in a larger village, Rujewa, chosen because of its logistical 
location and for the reason that there is a Water Basin Office in the village. I chose to work 
within the Usangu Plains, firstly, because various water uses co-exist in the basin, including 
domestic and livestock water supply, irrigation, hydropower generation, fishing and wildlife 
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water supply (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:2). Secondly, because several authors 
(Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999, Sokile, Kashaigili and Kadigi 2003, van Koppen et al. 
2004, Lankford et al. 2004) have documented the occurrence of water related conflicts in the 
area, and my studies thus supplement these by including cooperative events and by elaborating 
on the existing knowledge concerning water conflicts. As for the selection of two case villages, 
the Water Basin Officer Mr. Msuya as well as my translator and local facilitator helped me 
identify a number of villages where different water uses and users co-exit and where the villagers 
rely on different types of water supply. Owing to the high cost of renting a car in Rujewa, me 
and my translator and facilitator had to ride on bicycles in order to get to the villages, which 
naturally gave us a limited choice as it was not feasible to ride more than 14 kilometres a day. I 
decided to choose two villages, which complied with my criteria of different user groups and 
which differentiated themselves from one another in relation to water sources for domestic 
water. I found that the villagers responded positively to our less fashionable way of getting 
around and some respect and openness was earned by riding a bike instead of driving a car. 
Furthermore, it became apparent to them that my financial means were limited and I was never 
asked directly for financial support. On the downside, it was considerably energy consuming.  
 
2.5 Qualitative approach – Interviews and Observation 
Qualitative research is generally used to study matters such as people’s understandings and 
interactions (Silverman 2005:9) and is thus highly relevant for studying the nature of water 
conflict and cooperation. Common methods within the qualitative approach are semi-structured 
interviews, observations, discussions and other participatory approaches, often a combination is 
applied in order to create and in-depth picture of a situation (Mikkelsen 2005:348). In this thesis, 
I relied on direct observation and semi-structured interviews. The purpose of my study is not to 
investigate who is right or wrong in relation to water management, but rather to analyse the 
dynamics in water conflict and cooperation 
 
2.5.1Direct observation 
Accompanied by my translator and facilitator, I saw a number of the various water points in both 
villages. Seeing the riverbed, the irrigation channels, the self-dug wells, the taps, and the pump 
wells did not only clarify my understanding of the practical constraints and possibilities, it also 
created a basis for understanding the background for the corporative and conflictive events 
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taking place in the villages. I observed how the women collected water for domestic use and how 
the pastoralists would supply their cattle with water. 
 
2.5.2 Selection of informants 
In total, I carried out 32 interviews. I strived to achieve a gender balance, but it seemed that the 
men where the ones who had the most spare time on their hands during my stay and they are 
therefore over represented in relation to the women. We interviewed 20 men and 12 women, see 
the below list of interview informants. In the interview list, I noted personal characteristics of the 
informants in order to remember the specific situation and thereby the interview, however I have 
deleted characteristics of a personal character as they are not relevant anyone else but myself. In 
addition to the list of interviews I kept a journal to keep track of the daily activities, thoughts and 
ideas. The local authorities in the villages insisted on selecting the respondents and I was merely 
allowed to say what ‘type’ of person (occupation, gender, age, ethnicity) I wished to talk with. It 
seemed that the authorities chose the villagers they knew best, but that they on my request also 
tried to select respondents that reflected the village in general. Had I been able to make my own 
sampling of interview respondents I would have carried out a stratified random sampling, 
dividing the villagers into strata according to the different user groups, in order to achieve as 
accurate a representation of the villagers as possible and include the perspective of all user 
groups. The lack of opportunity to do this implies that there may be an unequal representation of 
the villages. Another concern is that the village authorities may have kept me from interviewing 
people with a negative view upon the authorities’ role in water management. On one occasion, I 
was confronted with a strong criticism of one of the village leaders from Mawindi, if I had been 
able to select my informants myself, more conflicts between the villagers and the village leader 
might have been revealed.  
 
Regarding age groups, the oldest informant was 62 years old and the youngest 19, but the 
majority of the people available for interviews were 30-40 years old. In my opinion, we seemed 
to cover all the ethnical groups existing in the two villages, Sangu, Hehe, Bena and Maasai, 
however we only talked with one Maasai family as they tend to live in the outskirts of the 
villages. In general, there did not seem to be any substantial difference between the ethnical 
groups. Concerning forms of occupation, the villagers were largely involved in (irrigation) 
cultivation and pastoralism, and we carried out interviews with both user types as well as key 
interviews with representatives from irrigation- and pastoralist groups. Furthermore, we 
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interviewed one village leader in each village in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
village institutions in particular the village governments, and the existing rules and norms 
regarding water management.  
 
2.5.3 List of interviews 
Int. 
no 
Date Village Name Ethnicity Age Sex Characteristics 
 
1 12 Nov Mawindi Alfons Delile Sangu 62 M  
2 12 Nov Mawindi Blatus Emmanuel 
Mjovea 
Hehe 28  M  
3 12 Nov Mawindi Brasius William 
Ngalile 
Sangu 37 M  
4 12 Nov Mawindi Melina Paulo 
Kasoli 
Bena 43 F  
5 12 Nov Mawindi Amchila Mfilinge Hehe 52 F  
6 13 Nov Mawindi Edward Solli Hehe 51 M  
7 13 Nov Mawindi Dlosolili Meja Sangu 41 F  
8 13 Nov Mawindi Tobia Mesja   M WUA secretary  
9 13 Nov Mawindi Athila Josef Kinya Hehe 42 F  
10 13 Nov Mawindi Telesina A. Nuylulu Bena 40 F  
11 14 Nov Mawindi Romanus Ngovano   M Member of village 
government  
12 14 Nov Mawindi Alfred Mpembwe   M WUA secretary  
13 14 Nov Mawindi Ponsiano Kamage Bena 44 M Pastoralist  
14 15 Nov Isunura Hawa Ibrahim Hehe 47 F  
15 15 Nov Isunura Clofa Mkweji Bena 37 F  
16 15 Nov Isunura Silanus Njojo Sangu 34 M Pastoralist 
17 15 Nov Isunura Andrew 
Mtemaigwe 
   WUA secretary 
18 16 Nov Isunura Silvio A. Mbshillah   M Water committee 
19 16 Nov Isunura Laurencia Udambe Sangu 55 F  
20 26 Nov Isunura Subira Ngovano Hehe 19 F  
  21 26 Nov Isunura Sarafina Lupeke Hehe 30 F  
  22 26 Nov Isunura Juma Mpanwa Sangu 40 M  
  23 27 Nov Isunura Pius Mlumba  76 M WUA chairman 
  24 27 Nov Isunura Fedezisi Naojule Sangu 38 M Member of village 
government 
  25 27 Nov Isunura Ferdinand Njojo Sangu 39 M Pastoralist 
  26 28 Nov Isunura John Mbishila Sangu 53 M Pastoralist 
  27 29 Nov Mawindi Renatus Kajimba Sangu 30 M Pastoralist 
  28 29 Nov Mawindi Venasia Chawala Hehe 33 F  
  29 29 Nov Mawindi Salvatory Ngalile Sangu 43 M Pastoralist 
  30 30 Nov Mawindi Dakati Lupembe Maasia 48 M Maasai 
  31 30 Nov Mawindi Imakulata Lelenga Hehe 40 F  
  32 30 Nov Mawindi Taitus Mbaya Bena 50 M Pastoralist 
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2.5.4 Semi-structured interviews 
Due to the different characteristics of the informants I prepared interview guides adjusted to the 
different groups. For example, some questions would be relevant for pastoralists but not for 
irrigation farmers and vice versa. Furthermore, interviews with village leaders, chairmen and 
secretaries required interview guides of even more diverse nature. When necessary, I changed 
the general interview guide and naturally several adjustments and additions were carried out 
during the individual interviews. In appendix one a copy of one of my interview guides is found. 
I did not pay the informants for their participation in the interviews and thus found it important 
not to be of a inconvenience and therefore decided on a maximum timeframe of one hour. In 
general, I found that the less time spent on the interviews the more precise and comprehensible 
answers I would get whether this was due to the endurance of my translator, the patience of my 
informant, or the strength of my own attention. At the beginning of each day, my translator and 
me would go over the interview guides and I would explain not only the questions but also the 
overall purpose of the interviews. During the interview sessions, he would translate the answer to 
each current question, giving me the option to choose/change/add the next question. After 
thorough considerations, I decided to record all interviews with a small mp3 player. I am aware 
that this may have made the informants hold back information, particular information about 
conflicts with authorities, however, I did not observe any timidity related to the recordings and 
find that the possible drawback was outweighed by the advantages given to me in form of 
increased understanding and information, as I listened though the recordings each evening while 
writing up the interviews on the computer. I did not transcribe the interviews precisely as the 
translation was much too intricate for this.  
 
2.5.5 Delimitations 
From the very beginning, it was my plan to carry out group discussions and participatory 
exercises in order to gain an understanding of the interaction between the different users and how 
they express their water concerns in a forum. This would also have indicated the existence of a 
potential power relationship in the villages. However, due to the research permit delay there was 
no time for this. I know from previous experience that participatory discussions may provide a 
different perspective on a certain situation compared to interview with individuals. On the other 
hand, I feel my translator was not sufficiently skilled in English in order to translate in such a 
forum and furthermore, encouraging group discussions may have caused outbreaks of conflicts.  
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More time in the villages and participant observation would have given me a more wide-ranging 
understanding of the rules and norms for water management and spending the night in the 
villages may also have contributed to my comprehension of the situation. However, as 
mentioned the time was severely limited, and my local facilitator and translator found it 
inappropriate for a young woman like me to stay the night in the villages. The lack of time also 
implied that I had no time to follow-up on the general findings. I was hoping to end my fieldtrips 
with a meeting where I could present my overall findings, both to let the villagers know the 
result of their interviews with me as well as to verify my findings.  
 
Working with a translator was a major constraint. There was always the risk that both the 
question and the answer had been reformulated and adjusted. I discovered that it was sometimes 
necessary to formulate the same question in different ways in order to double-check the answer. 
Furthermore, it is not always possible to directly translate concepts and words from one language 
to another. As consequence, the quotations consist of already interpreted expressions. Trying to 
obtain information about conflicts is a sensitive matter and I had to take linguistic detours in 
order to gain the openness of the villagers concerning conflictive events.  
 
Applying a quantitative approach in order to gain knowledge over the extent of water related 
conflict and cooperation would have been very interesting, but it was not feasible within the 
limited time available and furthermore, it was outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
Looking back, I whish I had paid more attention to inequalities in relation to water access. There 
is the possibility that e.g. women and poor people may be marginalized, however I regret failing 
to investigate this during my fieldwork. Instead I rely on secondary information to shed a light 
on these issues.  
 
2.6 Literature 
Much has been written about natural resource scarcity and conflict in general. The selection of 
literature becomes narrower when focusing explicitly on water conflict on local level, and even 
sparser is the literature including events of cooperation. As regards the institutional angle, the 
literature on institutions in natural resource management is comprehensive, however the specific 
aim of investigating the role of institutions in relation to water conflict and cooperation has 
constituted a challenge. I therefore rely greatly on scholars from within the general natural 
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resource management field such as Elinor Ostrom, Fikret Berkes, Daniel Bromley and Michael 
Cernea. Within the framework of legal pluralism the work of Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Rajendra 
Pradhan, Rutgerd Boelens, Margreet Zwarteween and Dik Roth has been the main foundation for 
the theoretical understanding. In various ways these authors differ substantially in their 
viewpoints, which is the very reason for including them. The intention of discussing opposing 
schools of thought is to create a sound basis for choosing a position. In order to supplement my 
own empirical findings and relate them to a wider context I draw substantially on scholars who 
have worked extensively with the matters of institutions, legal pluralism and water scarcity in 
Tanzania, these include among other Faustin Maganga, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Janik Boesen, Rie 
Odgaard, Leticia Nkonya and Barbara van Koppen.  
 
2.7 Theoretical framework 
As indicated in the introduction various factors affect water conflict and cooperation. This thesis 
deals with the role of institutions. As opposed to other natural resources water may be considered 
to be a special resource due to its low economic value but crucial importance, and its fugitive 
nature (Böge 2003:12,13). Based on the characteristics of water as a resource and on the 
Tanzanian context, I have chosen to operate with the following theoretical concepts: 
Conflict, cooperation and water scarcity are key terms in this thesis and the theoretical part will 
thus begin with a clarification of these. The next chapter deals with Common Pool Resources 
(CPR) management and Tenure regimes: because water is a common pool resource and that 
carries with it certain implications which need to be considered in order to investigate the 
relationship between institutions and CPR management. Understanding this relationship calls for 
a discussion of the concept ‘institution’. Subsequently, I examine the matter of legal pluralism 
due to the reason that Tanzania is a legal pluralism country, and because understanding law, 
rules and norms of behaviour are crucial to comprehending institution. The actors create the 
latter and consequently I aim to explore what makes the actors act through using the notions of 
‘uncertainties’ and ‘norms of behaviour’. The above has lead to the following guiding questions 
for the analysis (my guiding questions for the analysis are to be found after the sub conclusion of 
the theoretical part): 
- What is a common pool resource and what management implications are connected to it? 
- What is an institution and how is it related to water management? 
- How does legal pluralism influence local water management? 
- What role do the actors play in water management? 
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PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this part, I construct my theoretical framework and create a basis for analysing the empirical 
findings in part three. I begin by defining the key concepts used in thesis: conflict, cooperation 
and water scarcity. Next, I explain about common pool resources in order to comprehend what it 
implies that water is a common pool resource. Then I discuss the concept of institutions; what is 
an institution and how is it connected to water management? Subsequently, I examine the 
concept of legal pluralism, and finally I pay attention to the actors by examining their 
relationship to the resource and their motives for action.  
 
Chapter 3 Clarification of key concepts 
This chapter offers a clarification of three key terms used in this thesis: ‘conflict’, ‘cooperation’ 
and ‘water scarcity’. The terms can be understood in various ways therefore this chapter serves 
to explain the way I use them in this thesis.  
 
3.1 Conflict 
The concept ‘conflict’ is often defined as “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors 
strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources” (Wallensteen 
2002:15). Although ‘scarce’ does not necessarily mean that the resource is limited. The 
perception of a resource as limited is often connected to inequalities in the distribution, however 
in other cases it is in fact a matter of physical scarcity (Thomasson 2005:9). I return to the matter 
of ‘scarcity’ shortly. The definition of conflict is commonly illustrated by the conflict triangle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Conflict Triangle 
(Thomasson 2005:9) 
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The ‘attitudes’ are the standpoints of the actors in the conflict and are often replaced with 
‘actors’ or ‘interests’ to make it more evident that these are the actual parties to a conflict. The 
dynamics, or actions, are the way the conflict evolves, whether violent or not. Conflicts often 
change in intensity over time and eventually disappear or become transformed to political issues 
(Thomasson 2005:9). In addition, I find that conflicts are not always solved, but may be of a 
recurrent nature, e.g. the recurrent conflicts connected to the division of water for irrigation. 
 
Conflicts over resource use quite often originate in the different perceptions regarding access, 
use and management of resources. The cultural and ethnic diversity of resource users also have 
implication for the way natural resources are managed as well as the way conflicts are created or 
managed (Mwakaje and Sokoni 2005:50). However, resource conflicts cannot simply be reduced 
to struggles between different ethnic groups or disputes between cultivators and pastoralists. 
Conflicts take place at various levels, between different actors, and some conflicts over property 
are in reality embedded in martial and familial relations (Maganga 2002B:55).  
 
Although water scarcity is commonly mentioned in relation to water conflicts it is not solely the 
quantitative issue that may trigger conflict. Contamination of the resource that negatively affects 
its qualitative natural regeneration so the resource can no longer be used for life-sustaining 
purposes also serves as a catalyst for conflicts. This is particularly a problem between upstream 
and downstream riparians (Böge 2003:5). For the two case villages the matter of contaminated 
water constitutes a conflict between pastoralists and domestic users.  
 
It is important to stress that conflict is not inherently negative. Change often leads to conflict and 
inversely conflicts bring change. When a conflict is resolved or managed it often creates a new 
situation, which is likely to lessen the incompatibilities and grievances of the parties in a conflict 
(Thomasson 2005:10). Conflicts are thus crucial not only for social change but also for the 
continuous creation of society by society itself. As such situations of conflicts are neither 
positive nor negative, but they can be used constructively or destructively (Mwakaje and Sokoni 
2005:50). The way that conflicts evolve depends highly on the availability of institutions or 
mechanisms that are accepted by the parties and that can address the conflict (Thomasson 
2005:10). Furthermore, I find that what may be a conflict to some people is not necessarily 
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perceived as a conflict by others. For example, a downstream farmer may find it problematic that 
an upstream farmer is using a large amount of water, while the upstream farmer does not see it as 
a problem. 
 
There are different words for describing conflicts within countries. In this thesis, I have chosen 
to use the term ‘local’ to identify small-scale conflicts affecting specific areas within Tanzania. 
The conflicts dealt with based on the empirical information are largely limited to the boundaries 
of the two specific villages. Another option would have been to use the term ‘intra-state’ 
conflict, however I find ‘local’ to be more commonly used and to be more apt in this context. 
 
3.2 Cooperation 
Cooperation on the other hand is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as: “the fact of doing 
something together or of working together towards a shared aim” (Wehmeier 2000:276). This 
definition is broad, but matches the reality that many types of cooperation may be found. For 
example, the villagers cooperate when they divide water for irrigation in the Water User 
Associations, and when they develop rules and norms for water use for various water user 
groups. Based on my fieldwork and other studied events of cooperation I find that ‘cooperation’ 
may both be of a visible (e.g. Water Users Associations) and invisible character (rules and norms 
of behaviour). Although, events of cooperation are not necessarily conflict free nor do they by 
definition have an equal power relationship. In addition, cooperations are not automatically ‘all-
embracing’ in fact they may serve to exclude certain actors or groups.  
 
3.3 Water scarcity 
By definition scarcity implies diminishing resources and/or a pressure on the supply of available 
resources from an increasing demand. Three types of scarcity are often depicted (Ohlsson 
1999:2): 
a) Demand-induced scarcity ensuing from the water needs of increasing populations 
b) Supply-induced scarcity caused by rivers running dry, lowered water tables, and polluted 
groundwater and surface water courses 
c) Structural scarcity as more powerful segments of water users confiscate a larger part of 
the scarce resource, resulting in the ecological and economic marginalization of the less 
powerful.  
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All three types are present in Tanzania. The taps wells in Isunura often run dry and according to 
the villagers this it due to a growing population in the nearby village Rujewa. The water passes 
though Rujewa first and is consumed by the increasing population leaving little water for the 
villagers of Isunura, who thus suffer from a demand-induced scarcity. The structural scarcity 
comes into play when considering the water management of Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
(TANESCO). Not only do conflicts over water occur between farmers and TANESCO 
(Kashaigili et al. 2003:843) farmers in the Rufiji Basin in addition suspect the government of 
trying to safeguard TANESCO’s interest through basin management (Maganga 2002A:5). 
However, I found that the main occurring scarcity in the two case villages is the supply-induced 
scarcity. Without exception, the respondents all claimed that less rainfall and thus less water in 
the river causes the water scarcity in their area (Field data). As explained in the thesis, some 
claim that Tanzania is characterised by an increasing water scarcity (Kashaigili et al. 2003:839), 
while other state that it is merely a seasonal scarcity (van Koppen et al. 2004:4). Based on my 
fieldwork it is evident, that the villagers perceive their situation as being one of water scarcity, at 
least in the dry season. During the wet season they may experience both scarcity and flooding 
depending on the weather (Field data). Instead of relying on a strict physical measurement of 
water scarcity I therefore focus on the perception of the villagers, as I find that it is their 
conception of the situation that is decisive for events of conflict and cooperation. I agree that 
“However useful purely physical measures may be for broad comparisons, they cannot 
adequately reflect the variety of ways in which human beings use water – neither to their 
wastefulness when water is perceived as abundant nor to their ingenuity when it is not” (Wolfe 
and Brooks 2003:99). 
 
When investigating the role of institutions in water conflict and cooperation situations it is 
helpful to distinguish between first-order scarcity and second-order scarcity. First-order 
conflicts are caused by the scarce resource itself, while second-order conflicts are caused by the 
very means societies employ to overcome the first-order scarcity (Ohlsson 1999:1). A society 
that is unable to manage its way around first-order scarcity is thus subject to a second-order 
scarcity (Wolfe and Brooks 2003:100). For example, a first-order conflict may occur between 
two irrigation cultivators over the division of the sparse water. In order to solve such situations 
the government imposes the legal precondition of ‘water rights’ with the aim to determine who 
gets how much water, and this in turn causes conflicts between the government and the 
 26 
cultivators. Consequently, second-order conflicts are not caused by water scarcity itself, but by 
the institutional change required to adapt to water scarcity. The lack of ability of communities, 
societies and states to find the social solutions to deal with the first-order and second-order 
conflicts is called social resource scarcity (Ohlsson 1999:1-2). 
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Chapter 4 Common pool resources 
This chapter explains the concept of common pool resources as well as the tenure regimes linked 
to common pool resource management. The aim is to create awareness about the characteristics 
of common pool resources in order to subsequently investigate the institutional framework 
related to common pool resources.  
 
Common pool resources (CPR) are natural or man-made resources used simultaneously or 
sequentially by members of a community or a group of communities. In semi-arid Africa they 
include rangeland, uncultivable fields, fallow fields, crops residues, forests, inland waterways, 
seasonal ponds and low-lying wetlands. Common pool resources share two important 
characteristics: excludability and subtractability. Excludability arises from several factors 
including the cost of parcelling or fencing the resource and the cost of designing and enforcing 
property rights to control access to the resource. Subtractability creates rivalry between different 
users as the resource units that one user extracts from a common pool resource are not available 
to other users (Berkes 1989:7, Williams 1998:1). 
 
Water, or the so-called complete hydrological cycle, is a common pool resource. How this 
resource is managed depends on central state institutions, and regional and district level 
regulations. Certain parts of the cycle will therefore be subject to differing rules. Surface water 
may be treated differently to ground water. Ground water may be subject to differing rules 
depending on how it is extracted, what use it is put to and how much is involved. Lakes and 
oceans are subject to international institutional arrangements that are often conflicting with 
national and local institutions, interests and practice. Because water is not only a common pool 
resource, but is also a fugitive resource its management and the rules defining access and 
exclusion are necessarily complex and often subject to a plurality of overlapping jurisdictions 
(Latham 2002:5). 
 
When dealing with common pool resources attention is often paid to sustainability. Climatic, 
demographic and economic changes may threaten the existence and sustainability of CPRs and 
the stress put on CPRs may lead to conflicts (Williams 1998:3). However, the focus of this thesis 
is on the institutions governing CPR, in this case water. It is widely recognized, that institutions 
play a key role in shaping how CPR users coordinate their actions to solve supply and demand 
dilemmas (Bromley and Cernea 1989, Ostrom 1992, Cleaver 2000). The most influential 
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institution affecting how people interact with natural resources is property rights. Property rights 
not only affect who may use which resource and in what ways, but also shape the incentives 
people have for investing in and sustaining the resource base over time (Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan 2001:10) hence the following chapter describes the tenure regimes related to CPR.  
 
4.1 Tenure regimes 
A resource regime is a structure of rights and duties characterising the relationship of individuals 
to one another with respect to that particular resource. Sets of institutional arrangement are 
continually established to define the property regime over land and related natural resources, 
whether that regime is state property, private property or common property. Property is not an 
object such as land, but is rather a right to benefit from e.g. a stream (Bromley and Cernea 
1989:5). Furthermore, it is often not possible to classify which property regime a certain CPR 
belongs to as they may be held under various, and overlapping, regimes (Williams 1998:2). 
”Tenure may be defined as a condition. It is a form of right or title under which property is held. 
Thus tenure may be permanent and individual such as in an entitlement to certain property or 
land (for which a written instrument is proof of title – a title deed). It may be a limited right to 
some good or thing for a limited period – such as rental or hire of a parcel of land” (Latham 
2002:2). 
 
Tenure systems over property can be classified as follow: 
Open Access System: 
Open access systems are those where there are no “rules of the game” and where 
there is a free for all regime. Anyone may have access to the resource on a first 
come first served basis or on the basis of dominance over others. Open access 
systems are generally not sustainable and are therefore by their nature uncommon 
(Latham 2002:3). 
 
Private property regimes: 
Under this system an individual, or a recognised legal body, holds property under 
strict rules of ownership. That is to say they have rights over the property, which 
include the right to exclude others from access to its resources. They have the right 
to dispose of the property by sale to whom they wish and they may use the property 
as collateral to borrow capital (Latham 2002:3). 
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Common property: 
Common property regimes are those where its users manage a given resource 
jointly. A common feature is that the users have the right or power to exclude non-
members from access to the resource. They have rules or regulations that determine 
“use rights” by members to the common pool resource. Often, users have a right to 
a specific portion of the resource within the common pool over which they too 
exercise rights of inclusion or exclusion, subject to agreed conditions. These 
institutional arrangements define the rights and obligations of the users and 
determine who those users may be (Latham 2002:3). 
 
State ownership: 
In a state property regime, ownership and control over use rests in the hands of the 
state. Individuals and groups may be able to make use of the resources, but only at 
the forbearance of the state. The state may reserve certain land or other resources as 
state property, e.g. national parks, forest reserves, waterways etc. (Bromley & 
Cernea 1989:11). 
 
The term ’common property’ has been largely misunderstood and falsely interpreted in the past. 
Common property regimes are not the free-for-all that they have been described to be, but are 
structured ownership arrangements within which management rules are developed, group size is 
known and enforced, incentives exist for co-owners to follow the accepted institutional 
arrangements, and sanctions work to ensure compliance. When local-level institutional 
arrangements were undermined or destroyed, the common property regimes gradually converted 
into open-access in which the rule of capture drove each other to get as much as possible before 
others did. While this has been referred to as the “tragedy of the commons
1
” it is in reality, the 
“tragedy of open access” (Bromley and Cernea 1989:iii). There is thus a critical difference 
between ‘open-access resources’ and ‘common-property resources’. Property is a secure claim 
on a future benefit stream. There is no property in an open-access situation, only the opportunity 
to use something (Bromley 1992:11). 
 
Common property regimes may take various forms but one example is that of irrigation systems: 
                                                
1
 In his article The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968, Garret Hardin uses a field of pasture open to all, to illustrate how 
each herder will try to add more and more animals which eventually leads to overgrazing (Hardin 1968). 
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“Irrigation systems represent the essence of a common property regime. There is a well-defined 
group whose membership is restricted; an asset to be managed (the physical distribution 
system); an annual stream of benefits (the water that constitutes a valuable agricultural input); 
and a need for group management of both the capital stock and the annual flow (necessary 
maintenance of the system and a process of allocating the water among members of the group if 
irrigators), to make sure that the system continues to yield benefits to the group” (Bromley 
1992:11-12). 
 
In Tanzania, water is in theory ‘state property’ since the Water Utilisation Act of 1974 declares 
all water to belong to the Republic (Maganga et al. 2004:2). No individuals can have private 
ownership over water, but they may obtain rights to use water (Nkonya 2006:55). Although on 
local level, the extraction and use of water is in the context of this study played out in a common 
property framework (Field data). I shall return to the reasons and implications of this in the 
chapter 6 ‘Legal pluralism’ as well as in the analytical part four. Based on the knowledge that 
water is a common pool resource and in the case of Tanzania both state property and common 
property, I proceed to a study of the institutional framework for managing CPR with the 
intention of reaching an understanding of the concept of institution as well as how institutions 
govern water management and thereby influence water conflict and cooperation.  
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Chapter 5 Institutions 
This chapter deals with the complexities of institutional arrangements in management of 
common pool resources, in particular water. First, I discuss how to define ‘institution’. As shown 
there is no unanimity concerning the concept of ‘institution’ and it is therefore necessary to 
clarify how the concept of institutions is defined and used in this context. I cast a critical view on 
traditional approaches to the role of institutions in CPR management with the aim to comprehend 
the functioning of CPR institutions and develop an understanding of the concept appropriate for 
this thesis. Lastly, I briefly describe customary and formal institutions, as they are crucial in the 
Tanzanian water management context. 
 
5.1 Institutions and organizations 
Some scholars use the concept of institution and organization interchangeably while others make 
a clear distinction between the two concepts. According to writers like Uphoff
2
 (1986) and 
Maganga
3
 (1995) an institution may or may not be an organization.  
“The terms institution and organization are commonly used interchangeably and this contributes 
to ambiguity and confusion. Three categories are commonly recognized: (a) organizations that 
are not institutions, (b) institutions that are not organizations, and (c) organizations that are 
institutions (or vice versa, institutions that are organizations) “. […]“In general institutions, 
whether organizations or not, are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by 
serving collectively valued purposes. Institutions can be concrete and specific like a nation’s 
central bank or quite diffuse and general such as the institution of money. Some kinds of 
institutions have an organization’s form with roles and structures, whereas others exist as 
pervasive influences on behaviour” (Uphoff 1986:8-9). 
 
Others, like North
4
 (1993) and Ostrom
5
 (2006) make a clear distinction between the two terms. 
North views institutions as ‘rules of the game’ while organizations according to him is ‘a set of 
players’ a team working within the framework of the rules towards specific objectives’ (North 
1993:12). According to North, institutions can be both formal (constitutions, laws, property 
rights) or informal (sanctions, taboos, traditions and codes of conducts) and they may be created 
(e.g. a constitution) or they may simply evolve over times, as does common law. Organizations, 
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like institutions, provide a structure to human interaction, this structure consists of human 
beings, while the other is composed of rules, laws etc. (Boesen, Maganga and Odgaard 
1999:116).  
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. […] Institutions reduce uncertainty by 
providing a structure to everyday life” (North 1990:3). 
 
Also distinguishing between institutions and organizations, Ostrom emphasizes the visibility of 
organizations, stating that organizations are visible and measurable (because they consist of 
human beings), while the rules in use by the organization consist of common knowledge (which 
people have in their heads) or those that are written down on paper (Ostrom 1992:19). Ostrom 
defines institutions the following way: 
“…an institution is simply a set of rules actually used (the working rules of ‘rules in use’) by a 
set of individuals to organize repetitive activities that produce outcomes affecting those 
individuals and potentially affecting others. Hence an irrigation institution is the set of rules for 
supplying and using water in a particular location” (Ostrom 1992:19). 
 
This point of view is similar to that of Gibbs
6
 and Bromley
7
 (1986) who state that institutional 
arrangements are defined as the rules and conventions, which establish people’s relationships to 
resources, translating interests into claims, and claims into property rights (Gibbs & Bromley 
1986:22).  
 
Franks
8
 and Cleaver
9
 (2007), on the other hand, describe institutions as “arrangements between 
people, which are reproduced and regularized across time and space and which are subject to 
constant processes of evolution and change” (Frank and Cleaver 2007:295). They suggest that 
actors construct mechanisms of water governance
10
 both consciously and non-consciously; 
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through the processes of management and through the practices of everyday lives. This implies 
that the conscious design of such water governance mechanisms may lead to unintended 
outcomes as the daily practices of agents’ lives may shape water access around different 
principle and priorities (Frank and Cleaver 2007:297).  
 
Mehta
11
 supports the viewpoint of Franks and Cleaver in arguing that:  
“in conjunction with uncertainty, institutions are not merely rules of the game or formal 
institutions. Instead, they emerge as sites of social interaction, negotiation and contestation 
comprising heterogeneous actors having diverse goals (not all of which are material or 
economic). Institutions in natural resource management are not singularly purposive and cannot 
be easily separated from the everyday beliefs, lives and practices of people” (Mehta 2000:5). 
 
5.2 Criticism of traditional approaches 
As shown above institutions are commonly considered to be rules, regulations or conventions, 
but they can also be seen in more processual and dynamic ways as the product of social and 
political practices. Institutions can both be understood as enabling (in providing ways through 
which people negotiate their way though the world) and constraining (in providing rules for 
action) (Mehta et al. 1999:13).  
“Rather than mere rules or regulations, institutions are seen to be what people ‘do’ or how 
people ‘behave’; such approaches thus endow actors with a greater agentive role” (Mehta et al. 
1999:13). 
 
It can be argued that some CPR theories, in spite of contributing to the understanding of the 
importance of local institutions in natural resource management, have tended to neglect the 
everyday contexts within which institutions are located and their rootedness in local history and 
society. Furthermore, their conceptualisation of collective action tends to promote a corporate 
and homogenous view of ‘community’, downplaying issues concerning difference, power and 
politics. These approaches have also presupposed a non-interactive divide between formal and 
informal institutions, neglecting the ‘messy middle’ where different institutional domains 
overlap and are beset by ambiguity (Mehta et al. 1999:5). Yet evidence suggests that natural 
resources are often managed amidst a mix of institutional types and arrangements, which 
transcend these divides and tends to be messy, overlapping and power-ridden (Mehta et al. 
1999:13). Power shapes and permeates institutional arrangements and gives rise to differentiated 
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access to and control over resources. In more recent views, power relations are central to the 
analysis of how institutions govern the use of natural resources (Mehta et al. 1999:35). 
 
Another point of criticism is that traditional CPR approaches have tended to focus on purposive 
institutions, frequently assuming that institutions are designed specifically to perform certain 
natural resource management functions. Hence emphasis is placed on a matching of particular 
institutions to particular issues – water management committees, fishing groups etc. This 
contrasts with the emphases of much sociological and anthropological work, which examines the 
complex matrix of institutions in which people live their lives. The focus on collective action has 
tended to direct attention away from the fact that while institutions can enhance co-operation, 
they can also be beset with conflict, factional division, and as mentioned power politics (Mehta 
et al. 1999:14-15). 
 
In effect, the mainstream CPR literature tends to see institutions as key in eliminating 
uncertainty, in terms of transactions and information costs. The basic assumption is that 
commonly shared institutions save the cost of monitoring and enforcing other people’s 
behaviour. For example, Uphoff writes that institutions in natural resource management may 
facilitate quicker and less costly monitoring of changes in the status of resources (Uphoff 1986). 
Collective action and compliance may be seen as ‘rational options’ when they produce results 
that are beneficial to all, at times when self-interested action would otherwise produce 
collectively sub-optimal results. Hence, institutions tend to be seen as a way of regulating action 
to eliminate uncertainty, usually in terms of people’s behaviour (Mehta et al. 1999:14-17). I 
return to the notion of ‘uncertainty’ in chapter 7.1. 
 
Cleaver (2000) too, questions the possibility of consciously and rationally crafting institutions 
for collective action. Instead he supports ideas about multiple processes of institutional formation 
and combining both conscious and unconscious acts, unintended consequences and a large 
amount of borrowing of accepted patterns of interaction from sanctioned social relationships 
(Cleaver 2000:366). Furthermore, he uses examples from Nkayi District, Zimbabwe to 
demonstrate that institutions are partial, intermittent and often invisible, being located in the 
daily interactions of ordinary lives (Cleaver 2000:381). 
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5.3 Resource management mechanisms 
An alternative way to perceive institutions’ role in natural resource management is as ‘resource 
management mechanisms’ (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999). The concept covers four 
categories (1) conflict resolution; (2) social groups; (3) rules and norms and actual practices; and 
(4) knowledge systems, experiences and habits. The nature of resource management mechanisms 
may be described as follows: 
“While resource management mechanisms structure people’s interaction, they are themselves 
human constructions, constantly changed by people’s actions, be they organized and deliberately 
directed towards changing the way resources are managed, or simply actions that contravene a 
rule to make it obsolete or alter it” (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:118). 
 
Consequently, the study of resource management must analyse how it affects people’s use and 
handling of natural resources, but perhaps even more with how, when and why people change 
their resource management mechanisms, and how that affects people’s use and handling of 
natural resources (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:118).  
 
Conflict and conflict resolution constitute a resource management mechanism it the sense that 
they often lead to change in resource management. Changes in society may be caused by 
pressure and demand on resources and in power relations leading to conflicts. Conflicts are often 
based on conflicting interests and competing perceptions of the resource and the maintenance as 
well as differentiated access (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:118).  
 
Another resource mechanism is social groups. Such groups may be councils of elders, 
committees, groups of individuals who are involved in a patron-client relationship, the family in 
its various forms etc. But also the court system, at the various levels where it operates, consists 
of a number of organizations of relevance for rule generation and enforcement. All of these fora 
and organizations play various types of roles in relation to both the generation, enforcement and 
change of rules and norms related to natural resource management. An individual may be part of 
several of these groups and organizations at the same time and move and out of social units with 
rules originating from various parts of the plural legal system, and potentially carrying rules and 
norms from one to the other (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:126).  
 
Rules and norms are crucial for the management of natural resources and thus make an important 
resource mechanism in particular, attention must be paid to customary rules and norms. They are 
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a product of human interaction and people follow or violate them, and they change them 
(Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:120). The importance of these has already been touched 
upon in relation to the nature of institutions, and in chapter 7.2 ‘Norms of behaviour’ the 
importance of norms of behaviour in relation to water management is further explained. 
 
Knowledge systems comprise those behavioural patterns and experiences that are socially shared 
but not backed by social sanctions. Just as laws and institutions they are of a fluid nature and 
constantly changed. Examples may include people inventing their own specific small pushcarts, 
developing special ways of lining irrigation furrows, or experimenting with ways of improving 
the fertility of the soil (Boesen, Odgaard and Maganga 1999:119).    
 
5.4 The concept of institution applied in this thesis 
In my opinion, viewing the concept of institutions as existing of various forms of resource 
mechanisms aids the understanding of the concept. It emphasises that there are both formal and 
customary institutions and those in-between. Institutions determine how people interact but they 
are constantly changed through the practices of everyday life, such as conflicts, social groups etc. 
The people creating institutions, whether consciously or non-consciously, are heterogeneous 
actors with often conflicting interests and through negotiation they make use of the institutions 
as frameworks for action. Institutions thus consist of complexes of rules and norms of behaviour, 
as well as the knowledge and practices of people. The concept ‘organisation’ on the other hand, 
is in this thesis to be understood as a group of individuals. In my opinion, an organisation will 
often be an institution in the sense that the group of individuals share various rules and norms 
connected to the nature of the organisation. For example, a pastoralist group is an organisation 
because it consists of a group of individuals, but it is also an institution in the sense that this 
group is characterised by shared but negotiated rules and norms, and patterns of behaviour. This 
way of understanding the concept of institution will guide my analysis. I will seek to identify 
various forms of institutions and investigate how they affect the actor’s use of water and equally 
important, I will analyse how the actors change and create institutions. For the time being, I 
proceed to an elaboration of customary and formal institutions, as these two concepts are used to 
a large extent throughout the thesis.  
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5.5 Customary and formal institutions  
Customary institutions may be defined as humanly devised constraints or complexes of norms 
and behaviours that are accepted by the community and persist over time serving collectively 
valued purposes. The laws developed by customary institutions are based on society’s implicit 
understanding. They include the community’s perceptions about the world, the accumulated 
wisdom of the past, and a current set of values. Thus, customary laws are part of a community’s 
heritage or culture. They are unwritten laws that are maintained from one generation to another, 
through various transmission mechanisms such as imitation, oral tradition and teaching. 
Examples of customary laws include taboos, traditions, cultural norms, beliefs, values, social 
networks, kinship ties and codes of conduct (Nkonya 2006:52). The enforcement of customary 
laws takes place through the use of sanctions such as expulsion from the community, ostracism 
by friends and neighbours, or loss of reputation (Maganga 2002B:54.)  
 
Tanzania abolished chiefdom officially in 1961 at its independence, however in some places 
traditional and customary leaders have co-existed with the new formal local governments and are 
still somewhat influential (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:8). In particular in the 
rural areas there is a strong allegiance to customary institutions (Nkonya 2006:56), which has 
also been observed in the Usangu Plains where “access to and use of water is regulated 
according to customary law and to village bye-laws, some of which are the outcome of colonial 
and postcolonial policies” (URT 1995: I, 4.6). 
 
In order to understand the nature of customary law it may be helpful to distinguish between the 
various types of customary law: 
a) Customary laws of specific ethnic groups 
b) Customary law which is applied in courts 
c) Customary law which is applied by traditional authorities (chiefs, headmen etc.) outside 
the state system 
d) Living customary law, e.g. customs and practices of the people today and the principles 
underlying these practices. (Juma and Maganga 2005:2): 
 
As regards the case villages used in this thesis two types of customary law can be identified: d; 
living customary law and c; customary law applied by traditional authorities. It has not been 
feasible to include the study of customary laws applied in courts in this thesis. Regarding 
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different laws for specific ethnic groups, it will appear from the analysis that in spite of the co-
existence of different ethnical groups within the villages, there is no ethnical distinction between 
the rules and norms applied. However, in order to elaborate on my findings I include examples 
from secondary empirical studies demonstrating the customary laws of specific ethnic groups. 
 
Whereas customary institutions are upheld by mutual agreement, or by relations of power and 
authority, formal institutions are those backed by law implying enforcement of rules by the state 
(Cousins 1997:61). Formal rules are an important part of the institutional framework but are only 
one part. To work effectively they must be complemented by informal constraints (conventions, 
norms of behaviour) that supplement them and reduce enforcement costs. If the formal rules and 
informal constraints are inconsistent with each other the resulting tension is going to induce 
political instability (North 1993:20). 
 
However, it is somewhat problematic to adopt a very strict distinction between ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ institutions of managing resource conflicts, since decisions in the ‘formal’ primary 
courts are also influenced by ‘informal’ institutions such as tribal elders who sit in the court as 
court assessors (Maganga 2002B:54), as explained through the notion of social groups as a 
resource management mechanism in chapter 5.3. Furthermore, it appears that in spite of the fact 
that formal laws are written and backed by the state, they need support from customary norms, a 
fact that draws attention to the dynamic interaction between different institutions as well as 
between institutions and users. The complex relationship between the different laws leads to a 
discussion of legal pluralism. As mentioned, Tanzania is a country characterised by legal 
pluralism, thus the aim of the following chapter is to understand the nature and effect of legal 
pluralism.  
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Chapter 6 Legal pluralism 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, institutions, whether formal or customary, consist 
among other matters of rules and laws for managing natural resources. I subsequently examine 
the nature of these and how they affect, and are affected by, the actions of users. I explain the 
relationship and interaction between customary and formal law as well as the power inherent in 
the two types of law. I have chosen to deal merely with customary and formal laws, as they are 
the ones most relevant for my empirical findings. Through the concepts ‘forum shopping’ and 
‘uncertainties’ I describe how actors use legal pluralism to adapt to- and negotiate their way 
through- challenges of water scarcity. Chapter 7 will give a more profound explanation of the 
‘actors’. I end this chapter by characterising the complexities of the term ‘water right’. However 
first, I clarify the meaning of legal pluralism.  
 
Law is an important tool in regulating water allocation, however, in most social settings more 
than one legal system becomes relevant. Law should not to be limited to state law but understood 
as cognitive, normative orders generated and maintained in a social field. It is thus possible to 
have various kinds of law such as state law, religious law, donor/project law, customary law, and 
local law. The coexistence and interaction of multiple legal orders within a social setting is 
called legal pluralism (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001:10, Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 
2005:6). Water resources and irrigation systems are good examples of legal pluralism, as they 
are often used by and managed under legally plural conditions, in which rules and principles of 
different origins, legitimated by different legal and normative frameworks, coexist and interact 
(Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 2005:13). 
 
6.1 The power relationship between customary and formal law 
The coexistence of several laws in one domain does not mean that all laws are equal, or equally 
powerful, nor do they all enjoy the same degree of legitimacy and respect. In some contexts, 
especially in the context of state and local community relationships, state law is usually more 
powerful and used by state officials, e.g. in allocating water from rivers and reservoirs for non-
agricultural uses. Powerful outsiders as well may use statutory law to claim resources in ways 
that are not locally recognized as legitimate (Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 2005:6, Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2002:4). Power relationships are in general very important for they often 
determine the distribution and actualisation of rights (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001:10-11).  
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Rights are only as strong as the institution or collectivity that stands behind them. The state is 
one important legitimating institution, but it is not the only one and in many cases it may not be 
as relevant as a village, and ethnic community or a users’ group. At local level we find a mixture 
of several normative orders, which are based on long historical tradition, e.g. customary law, 
new forms of self-regulation, elements of old and new state laws etc. Rules and laws themselves 
are subject to negotiation, reinterpretation and change. The way, in which people call upon 
different legal orders and the negotiation between them, provides some of this dynamism. It is 
not the case that only local law adapts to be consistent with statutory law; the latter also changes, 
taking into account a range of religious, customary and other types of law. However, it is 
important to distinguish between the legal construction of rights from the actual social 
relationships that connect concrete right holding individuals, groups and associations, because 
the laws concerning property rights do not always reflect actual practice (Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan 2001:10-11). 
 
Customary and indigenous water management arrangements are still very important in the local 
context. However, local non-state actors and their customary ways of water management and 
conflict resolution are often ignored by state agencies and international organizations. In regions 
with weak statehood and a weak formal economy, customary law, ‘informal’ institutions and 
traditional authorities play a decisive role in water management on the ground. Often the statal, 
formal water management and the local, customary water management conflict with each other, 
thus adding further conflict potential to already difficult circumstances. Therefore, the 
recognition of legal pluralism is crucial and modern states have to adapt and integrate customary 
elements into formal water management. Though a romanticism of customary law must be 
avoided; traditional structures are not per se better than formal structures. For instance they may 
favour the community leaders and disadvantage the weak. Furthermore, local communities are 
not homogeneous nor do all community members share the same interests and norms. Customary 
law is far form being static, it changes and adapts to new circumstances. Nor is it a unified body 
of norms, rather it is localized and hence one is confronted with a myriad of different customary 
laws. Moreover, the extent to which customary law is still applied and the forms of 
accommodation of modern and customary law vary from place to place. Even at the local level, 
there may be conflicts between those that adhere to customary law and those that do not, over 
which legal system should have jurisdiction (Böge 2006:31-33).  
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The majority of rural Africa today is still under the some influence of customary institutional 
arrangements of water management. In Tanzania, the regulatory framework of water 
management is a mix of colonial and post-colonial state legislation and formal water rights on 
the one hand, and on the other hand a set of local, community based practices (Böge 2006:33). In 
South Africa, case study research from rural areas shows that there are villages where custom is 
still strong and traditional leaders play an important role. Here villagers have installed self-
regulated water supply systems along customary lines, and the traditional leader’s authority over 
water issues is extensive and includes conflict resolution in water matters (Böge 2003:35). 
Likewise it has been observed in the case of Nkayi district in Zimbabwe that villagers prefer to 
take decisions based on a process conducted through whole community meetings rather than 
through more exclusive committee structures. Showing that the inclusive participatory character 
is part of the strength of customary informal institutions (Cleaver 2000:370-371). Even in the 
field area of this thesis, Usangu Plains, Tanzania conflicts over irrigation water are generally 
resolved between irrigators themselves, by reference to ‘traditional’ elders and local customs, 
only if irresolvable are they referred to the Village Government and to Ward tribunals (Cleaver 
2000:36). 
 
6.2 Forum shopping  
In situations of legal pluralism individuals can make use of more than one law to rationalize and 
legitimise their claims, decisions or behaviour. Thus they can make selective, context-bound and 
strategic use of these options, phenomenons know as forum shopping or legal shopping 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001:10-11, Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 2005:6). Forum 
shopping, by which different parties base their claims on whichever legal framework they feel 
best fits their situation, is inherent in situations of legal pluralism. Given the heterogeneous and 
hierarchical nature of local communities, negotiation means that the powerful often can establish 
stronger rights. Women, members of lower classes or otherwise disadvantaged groups often lack 
the knowledge and bargaining power needed to actualise their rights. Establishing effective 
platforms for negotiation is critical for effective natural resource management. Without effective 
negotiation forums, conflicts can escalate, but with effective means of negotiating, various 
stakeholders can adapt to changing conditions (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002:13). For natural 
resource management an important point is that people are constrained by law, but that they can 
also use it as a resource, interpret it, and change it (Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 2005:7). 
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6.3 Legal pluralism and uncertainties  
Legal pluralism may increase the capacity of resource users to adapt flexibly to changes and 
various forms of uncertainty (Boelens, Zwarteveen and Roth 2005:14). Unpredictable 
fluctuations in the natural resource base call for different sets of rules to deal with different 
situations. The amount of water or grazing land that the different people are allowed to use will 
differ during a drought compared to a period of bountiful rainfall (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2001:12). It is common practice for rural people to employ flexible institutional arrangement and 
livelihood strategies to deal with ecological and seasonal variation, especially in risk-prone 
environments (Mehta et al. 1999:8-9). On the other hand, in some contexts of social and political 
change, legal pluralism can increase uncertainty for local resource users. This is especially seen 
when statutory law does not recognize customary rights, and those with greater political 
connections, knowledge of state law, or access to the courts uses state law to override customary 
rights, in order to capture resources (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002:13).  
 
6.4 Water rights 
Water rights are not an unitary item, but can include diverse bundles of rights, including use 
rights, decision-making rights, and income-earning rights over water. The nature of the bundles 
and the types of law applicable may differ depending on both the source of water and the use 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2005:238). There is often a distinction between use rights of access 
and withdrawal, and decision-making rights to regulate and control water uses and users. As for 
the third right, the right to earn an income from a resource, examples are government 
departments that collect revenue from water users, or individuals or communities that collect a 
charge from others who use water (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2005:240). 
“In farmer-managed irrigation systems, the farmers with rights to irrigate- and more specifically 
the managing committee members- collectively hold decision-making rights. Sometimes 
traditional village leaders or village councils may hold these decision-making rights. All 
landowning irrigators, men and women, may have categorical decision-making rights. However, 
women may not be able to concretise their rights because of time constraints, lack of confidence 
in the public sphere, gender ideology, or customary law that limits the rights of the women” 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2005:244). 
 
Water rights, like rights to natural resources in general, are embedded in social, political and 
economic relationships and are often closely tied to other rights. Changes in any of these 
relationships and rights affect property rights to natural resources. However, water rights are 
perhaps more dynamic, flexible and subject to continued negotiation than other natural resources 
because of the characteristics of water as a resource. Water is a mobile, fluid and fugitive 
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resource, with a great deal of inherent uncertainty regarding its quantity and location. There are 
often multiple users and uses of the same water source, with different categories of rights and 
rights holders to water as it flows along its course. For example, the state may claim ownership 
and control rights to a river throughout its course, while riparian communities may claim control 
and use rights to the river water as it flows past their localities (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2001:13).  
 
As demonstrated, institutions influence local water management substantially. One of the ways 
they do so is through customary and formal laws as well as specific water rights and water 
institutions. Through the previous chapters emphasis has been given to the role of the actors and 
the way their behaviour is shaped by institutions as well as the way the actors use institutions to 
negotiate their way though society. The resource management mechanisms served as an 
introduction to understand how the actors influence institutions, namely through 
conflicts/conflict resolution; social groups; rules norms and actual practice; and knowledge 
systems. However, much more focus on the actors is needed in order to understand their role in 
the institutional framework of common property resource management, and hence the outcome 
of water conflict and cooperation. The next chapter therefore deals specifically with the role of 
the actors. 
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Chapter 7 Actors in Common Pool Resources Management 
This chapter examines the role of the actors in common pool resources management. First I 
explain the relationship between the users and the natural resource, by applying Ostrom’s 
concepts of resource system and appropriators. Through this view upon the users and the 
resource I aim to reach an understanding of the users’ extraction of water as well as the 
behaviour of the users. Furthermore, I apply the concepts of ‘Uncertainties’ and ‘Norms of 
behaviour’ in order to clarify the motives behind the actors’ actions.  
 
7.1 The resource system and the appropriators 
Regarding the management of CPR it is important to distinguish between resource systems and 
resource units, while recognizing the dependence of the one on the other. Resource systems are 
stock of variables that are capable, under favourable conditions, of producing a maximum 
quantity of a flow variable without harming the stock or the resource system itself. Examples of 
resource systems include among others, groundwater basins, irrigation channels, streams, lakes, 
oceans and other bodies of water. Resource units are typified by e.g. the acre-feet cubic meters of 
water withdrawn from a groundwater basin or an irrigation canal (Ostrom 2006:30). The 
distinction between resource systems and resource units helps to illustrate the property division.  
 
The process of withdrawing resource units from a resource system is called ‘appropriation’. 
Hence those who withdraw such units are called ‘appropriators’ in this case e.g. irrigation 
farmers. Often appropriators use or consume the resource units they withdraw, but they may also 
use the units as inputs into production processes e.g. water for irrigation. In the context of this 
thesis, the irrigation farmers and pastoralists use water for production purpose, namely rice 
cultivation and cattle sustenance, whereas the domestic users drink water and use it for 
household purposes such as washing clothes and cooking. The term used to refer to those who 
arrange for provision of a CPR is ‘providers’ and the term ‘producer’ is used to describe anyone 
who constructs, repairs, or takes actions that ensure the long-term sustenance of the resource 
system itself. Often, providers and producers are the same individuals, but they do not have to 
be. For example, a national government may provide an irrigation system in the sense of 
arranging for its financing and design and then arrange with the local farmers to produce and 
maintain it. If the local farmers are given the authority to arrange for maintenance they become 
both the providers and the producers of maintenance activities related to a CPR. Multiple 
appropriators can undertake the actual process of appropriating resource units from the CPR 
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simultaneously or sequentially. The resource units however, are not subject to joint use or 
appropriation. The water spread on one farmer’s field cannot be spread onto someone else’s field 
(Ostrom 2006:31). In the case villages of this thesis, the irrigation farmers are both providers and 
producers and it is part of their customary law that all appropriators must contribute to the 
maintenance of the irrigation channels, a neglect to do so may result in a prohibiting a 
withdrawing resource units. However, as mentioned previously a characteristic of common pool 
resources is the difficulty of excluding users (excludability), thus the execution of such 
restrictions rests greatly on the strength and respect of the customary laws. The fact that resource 
units cannot be used jointly (subtractability) is also central to the conflict/cooperation 
perspective as many conflicts stem from disagreements regarding how many resource units an 
irrigation farmer may use on the expense of other appropriators (Field data). I return to a 
discussion hereof in the analysis.  
 
When multiple appropriators are dependent on a given CPR as a resource of economic activity, 
they are jointly affected by almost everything they do. Each individual must take into account 
the choices of others when assessing personal choices. For example, if one irrigator allocates 
time and materials to repairing a broken control gate in an irrigation canal, all other irrigators 
using that canal are affected by that action, whether or not they want the control gate fixed and 
whether or not they contribute anything to the repair. Co-appropriators are tied together in a 
lattice of interdependence as long as they continue to share a single CPR. This underlines the risk 
of conflicts as mentioned above, but also the fact that due to their interdependence the various 
water users are forced to find ways of cooperation. As will be shown in the analysis, agreements 
are formed both between different users groups (pastoralists-irrigation farmers, pastoralists-
domestic users) and within users groups (irrigation farmers, pastoralists, domestic users) because 
of this interdependence. The physical interdependence does not disappear when effective 
institutional rules are utilized in the governance and management of the CPR, what changes is 
the result the appropriators obtain. When appropriators act independently in relationship to a 
CPR generating scarce resource units, the total net benefits they obtain will usually be less than 
could have been achieved if they had coordinated their strategies in some way. At a minimum, 
the returns they receive from their appropriation efforts will be lower when decisions are made 
independently then they would have been otherwise. At worst they can destroy the CPR itself 
(Ostrom 2006:38-39). This physical interdependence is exactly why the appropriators create 
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customary laws dictating the use of different water points. For example, pastoralists are not 
allowed to use the same wells as domestic users, because the cattle may ruin the water source or 
make it dirty. Hence, it is better for the society in general, that the pastoralists use separate wells 
from the domestic users (Field data).  
 
7.2 Uncertainties 
The decisions and actions of CPR appropriators to appropriate from and provide a CPR are those 
of individuals who find themselves in complex and uncertain situations. How an individual acts 
will depend on how the individual weighs costs and benefits of the actions taken (Ostrom 
2006:33). Uncertainty is usually defined as a situation characterized by indeterminacies. Unlike 
risk, the probabilities are impossible to calculate (Mehta et al. 1999:5).  
 
Uncertainty has many external sources e.g. the quantity and timing of rainfall, the temperature 
and amount of sunlight, the presence or absence of disease-bearing vectors (Ostrom 2006:33). In 
effect, ecosystems are increasingly characterized by variability and unpredictability across time 
and space, and appreciating ‘ecological uncertainties’ is thus fundamental to understand the 
dynamics of resource management. Apart from ecological uncertainty, there are economic and 
social uncertainties. Economic systems are often uncertain and in constant flux, with capital 
flows knowing no boundaries and financial markets often behaving in an unpredictable manner. 
Likewise, the social world is characterized by uncertainty and complexity in terms of 
heterogeneous actors and institutional pluralism. Furthermore, there is knowledge uncertainty. 
Knowledge uncertainties arise when a person’s knowledge is incomplete and incapable of 
dealing with risks and hazards invisible from their partial perspective (Mehta et al. 1999:11-12). 
For example, it may not be immediately apparent, how one irrigator’s forbearance in taking 
water from a canal will affect the yield obtained by that farmer or by other farmers. In some 
cases, a farmer located near the head of a system may be able to curtail his water use 
substantially without major impact on his own yield, while substantially enhancing the yield of 
downstream farmers. In other cases, the excess water taken by the farmer located near the 
headworks may subsequently also flow to farmers located lower in the stream. Uncertainties 
stemming from lack of knowledge may be reduced over time as a result of skillful pooling and 
blending of scientific knowledge and local time-and-place knowledge, but uncertainty reduction 
is costly and never fully accomplished (Ostrom 2006:34). Thus, decisions must inevitably be 
made without complete knowledge. Second, the very plurality of knowledges and perspectives 
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on any given issue generates uncertainties, it becomes impossible to predict the behaviour of 
others who may see things in different ways. Therefore it becomes difficult to understand the 
unpredicted consequences where casual connections are contested and science is also seen as 
grounded in different perspectives (Mehta et al. 1999:12). 
 
Water is a very useful case for highlighting the various aspects of uncertainty. Inequalities in 
access to and control over water combined with ethnic rivalries and power politics have given 
rise to conflicts about water at various levels. Unlike other environmental resources such as 
forest and coal, water is a renewable resource, which means that its availability is constantly 
subjected to variation depending on its state in the hydrological cycle. In arid and semi-arid 
regions, water scarcity is temporal and linked to rainfall patterns, which are variable and erratic. 
Water availability is thus characterized by tremendous uncertainty, due to its contingency on 
factors such as rainfall, vegetation and grass cover. Water scarcity is rarely something that is 
constant and permanent. Periods with dearth are usually interspersed by periods of abundance. 
This is because water supplies become abundant under favourable seasonal and climatic 
conditions and it is crucial that institutions display flexibility in both periods of abundance and 
dearth (Mehta 2000:6). In the chapter 12.3.2 ‘Division of Water’, I demonstrate how the 
irrigation groups (Water Users Associations) adjust to this ecological uncertainty by applying 
rules of regulation for the extraction of water, adapting to the fluctuation in water availability.  
 
7.3 Norms of behaviour 
Norms of behaviour affect the way alternatives are perceived and weighed. When an individual 
has strongly internalised a norm related to keeping promises, for example, the individual suffer 
shame and guilt when a personal promise is broken. If the norm is shared with others, the 
individual is also subject to considerable social censure for taking an action considered to be 
wrong by others. For many routine decisions, actions that are considered wrong among a set of 
individuals interacting together over time will not even be included in the set of strategies 
contemplated by the individual. If the individual’s attention is drawn to the possibility of taking 
such an action by the availability of a very large payoff for doing so, the action may be included 
in the set of alternatives to be considered but with a high cost attached. Norms of behaviour are 
particular relevant in relation to opportunistic behaviour. In a setting in which few individuals 
share norms about the impropriety of breaking promises, refusing to do one’s share, or taking 
other opportunistic actions, each appropriator must expect all other appropriators to act 
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opportunistically whenever they have the chance. In such a setting it is difficult to develop 
stable, long-term commitments (Ostrom 2006:35-36). In regards to the field information for this 
thesis, it seems to be the case that the villagers as a whole share the norm about the disrespect of 
breaking rules and promises, however, incidents of opportunistic behaviour do occur regularly 
(Field data). This is no exception to the general picture, because in every group there will be 
individuals who ignore norms and act opportunistically when given a chance. There are also 
situations in which the potential benefits will be so high that even strongly committed 
individuals break the norms. Consequently, the adoptions of norms of behaviour will not reduce 
opportunistic behaviour to zero (Ostrom 2006:36).  
 
Free riding, rent seeking, and corruption are the three forms of opportunism that are the most 
prevalent in irrigation systems. In any situation where farmers do no contribute to the 
maintenance of a system, the difficulty of preventing them from benefiting from the 
construction, repair, or maintenance activities performed by others creates the potential for free-
riding behaviour (Ostrom 1992:53). As for the two case villages it is for example, a prevalent 
norm that everyone has to contribute to the maintenance of the irrigation channels in order to 
avoid free riding and the neglect to participate would not be tolerated. I elaborate on the 
behaviour of the villagers in the analytical part.  
 
7.4 Sub-conclusion 
Based on the presented theoretical framework, it is evident that in order to investigate 
institutions’ role in water conflict and cooperation, I need to analyse what rules and regulations 
the institutions propose for water management. Equally important is the call for investigating 
how the people in the two case villages shape and form the institutions. Based on the theoretical 
knowledge about customary and formal institutions, I examine what customary and formal 
institutions prevail in the case villages and how the legal pluralism affects the relationship 
between the people and water scarcity. The importance of understanding the role of the actors 
has been accentuated and consequently I seek to analyse how the villagers’ perceptions, actions, 
interests and norms of behaviour constitute the foundation for conflict and cooperation.  
Based on the above reflections my analysis is structured according to the following questions: 
- Why, when and between who do conflicts occur? 
- How are the conflicts solved and what role do the institutions play in conflict resolution? 
- What is the nature of the existing institutions and forms of cooperation? 
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Before continuing to the analysis, I find it important to first give a brief historic overview of 
water management in Tanzania. Subsequently, I describe the study area, and then the formal 
institutional framework. In the analysis, I rely on the information from these three parts as a 
context specific background.  
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PART THREE: Water management in Tanzania 
 
In this third part of the thesis, I give a historical introduction to water management in Tanzania. 
Subsequently, I describe the study area and the main water uses existing in the area. Finally, I 
describe the formal institutional framework for water management in Tanzania.   
 
Chapter 8 Historical introduction 
Since colonial times, Tanzania has taken several steps aimed at improving water supply and 
sanitation. One was the cost-sharing approach, during the colonial period, which began in 1930 
when the colonial government started to use public funds for the development of water supplies 
to areas it considered to be of prime interest: townships, mission stations, large estates and 
trading centres. After construction these water supply schemes were managed on a self-
supporting basis and all users were required to pay for the water they used. Active government 
involvement in the construction of rural water supply started in the 1950s, when local authorities 
were required to contribute 25% of the capital cost for water development projects, before the 
government would release the remaining 75%. Towards the end of 1969 the central government 
decided to meet the cost of operation and maintenance of all rural supply projects. This step 
made the central government responsible for both capital and recurrent costs for all rural water 
supplies. From this time water became a free good for the rural inhabitants. In urban centres, on 
the other hand, consumers who obtained water from metered public kiosks or those with house 
connections continued to pay for water. It was later decided that consumers who obtain water 
from public kiosks would also get water for free (Maganga, Butterworth and Moriarty 
2002:921). 
 
In 1971, the Tanganyika African Union (TANU) made a major policy decision committing the 
Government to an objective of providing water in all rural areas so that every rural inhabitant 
could have easy access to a source of adequate and potable water by 1991. In 1980, the 
government furthermore adopted the UN goals for the water decade, and mobilised external 
assistance to prepare regional water master plans and facilitate rapid construction of water supply 
schemes. However, little attention was given to the ownership of the systems, and local 
communities looked at the installations as the responsibility of the government (Maganga, 
Butterworth and Moriarty 2002:922).  
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In the 1980s, Tanzania was divided into nine basins
12
 and a River Basin Management Approach 
for water resource management was adopted. In 1993, the Rufiji Basin River Board was 
launched and the Rufiji Basin Water Office started operating in the same year (Sokile et al 
2005:2). This basin was selected because of its importance for the nation’s hydropower 
generation (van Koppen et al. 2004:5). The pilot experiments of water rights and fees in the 
Rufiji and Pangani basins implemented by the government had the two-fold aim of improving 
cost-recovery for basin-level water management services and fostering the wise use of this scarce 
resource (World Bank 1996 in van Koppen et al. 2004:1). However, contrary to expectations, the 
new system failed as a registration tool, a taxation tool
13
, and a water management tool and 
contributed to aggravating rural poverty. It increased upstream-downstream conflicts, because 
the upstream water users claimed that paying for water entitled them to use it as they like. In 
addition, customary water management principles upon which arrangements for better sharing of 
the limited quantity of water could have been grafted were eroded (van Koppen et al. 2004:vii).  
 
History of water management in Tanzania 
Source: (Sokile, Kashaigili and Kadigi 2003:1018) 
1967: Abolition of water users fee 
1971: Launching of 20-year rural water supply program 
1972: Abolition of local governments 
1974: Introduction of Water Utilization Act (control and regulation) 
1975: Separation of Water Department and Irrigation Department 
1981: Amendments of Water Utilization Act (control and regulation) 
1981: Designation of Tanzania into 9 water basins. 
1991: Institution of National Water Policy 
1991: Establishment of Rufiji Basin Water Board 
1994: Review of water user fee 
1995: World Bank Appraisal 
1996: Start of River Basin Management 
1999: Draft of New National Water Policy 
2001: Merge Ministry of Water with Livestock  
                                                
12
 Through Act No. 10 of 1981 which was an amendment of Principal Act No. 42 of 1974 
13
 Among small-scale users, taxation aggravates poverty – it is too costly and logistically unfeasible, and generates 
new water conflicts (van Koppen et al. 2004:3).  
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In general, fragmented planning and management, and a lack of integrated approaches and 
conflicting sectoral policies have contributed to increasing conflicts over water use in Tanzania. 
Prompted by increasing pressure on water resources, the government has tried to establish formal 
legal systems, fixing property regimes and formalising informal arrangement related to the use of 
this resource. The government has furthermore applied an Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) approach in an attempt to promote integration across sectors and take into 
consideration the multiple uses of water resources as well as the environmental impacts 
(Maganga 2002A:1). IWRM promotes integration across sectors, applications, groups in society 
and is based upon the Dublin principles agreed upon in 1992 (Maganga, Butterworth and 
Moriarty 2002:919). 
 
However, the participatory aspect of IWRM in Tanzania is questioned as it relies on static 
statutory laws and neglect customary arrangements, furthermore the policymakers have been 
influenced by the perception of property rights as being static and unitary rather than diverse and 
changing (Maganga 2002A:1). Tanzania has a pluralistic legal system and hence land and water 
resources are regulated by different pieces of legislation and institutions, including statutory law, 
customary laws of the 120-plus ethnic groups, Islamic law etc. (Maganga et al. 2004:1). 
 
The origin of the legal pluralism can be found in the colonial area when two parallel legal 
systems were created. This was apparent in the British colonial sphere, where the principles of 
Indirect Rule stated that Statutory Law should govern the Crown Lands while Africans living on 
Native Reserve Land should obey “traditional African” Customary law. After independence the 
divide continued; statutory law was acknowledged by the state as the formal legislation while the 
position of customary law practices became cloudier. Since customary law was often unwritten, 
it has had a hard time being recognised as a proper legislation and is consequently frequently 
referred to as “informal” (Carlsson 2003:8).  
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Chapter 9 Study area 
In Tanzania 6.3 million hectares (15% of the total arable land) is under rainfed and irrigated 
cultivation. The costal and highland areas receive well over 1,000 mm of rainfall per year and 
most parts of the drier interior receive less than 600 mm. As mentioned in the introduction, 
physical water resources are abundant, with an estimated 50% of all annual surface run-off 
flowing into the Indian Ocean and the large lakes. However, Tanzania lacks the economic 
resources to harness water and to overcome the extreme temporal and spatial variability in 
rainfall and surface flow (van Koppen et al. 2004:4). Although, in spite of the claimed water 
abundance the dry season is getting increasingly drier and the Ruaha River runs dry in several 
places for longer periods of time than it used to. Furthermore, the majority of the country’s 
electricity is based on hydropower, which is also threatened by the lack of water (Vilby 
2005:67). Some scholars such as Kashaigili et al. 2003 and Sosovele 2005 find that conflicts are 
becoming alarming and are exacerbated by increasing water demands due to rapid population 
growth and expanding economic activities. Particularly in the Rufiji basin do conflicts occur for 
example between Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) and the farmers, between 
groups of farmers (upstream and downstream), between the farmers and pastoralists, between 
water managers and farmers (Kashaigili et al. 2003:843). 
 
The Rufiji basin is the largest of the nine river basins in Tanzania and covers an area of about 
177,420 km2 and drains the Southern Highlands into the Indian Ocean. Various water uses co-
exist in the basin, including domestic and livestock water supply, and irrigation (mainly in the 
great Ruaha and Kilombero valleys); hydropower generation; fishing and wildlife water supply; 
and transport (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:2, Maganga, Butterworth and 
Moriarty 2002:920). The basin comprises four major rivers: The Great Ruaha, Kilomnero, 
Luwengu and Rufiji (Maganga, Butterworth and Moriarty 2002:920). Irrigation is the major 
activity and largest water user. In theory, a person or community must have a water right (see 
chapter 10 ‘Formal Institutional Framework) to be allowed to take water from a pump or an 
irrigation ‘furrow’. However, in general smallholder irrigators don’t hold water rights. Tanzania 
has a very long history of indigenous irrigation, and people do not understand why they must 
now pay for a permit for something their ancestors have always seen as a right (Maganga, 
Butterworth and Moriarty 2002:924). Problems arise during periods of water scarcity when 
conflicts and disputes over access to water become common. As much water is diverted to the 
fields for irrigation and brick making, the reduced river flows fail to supply full requirements 
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downstream. Downstream of the Ruaha National Park there are two hydropower stations (Mtera 
and Kidatu) depending much on the basin for their power generation, contributing about 50% of 
the Tanzania national grid (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:2).  
 
 
The Upper Ruaha catchment lies within the Rufiji Basin and forms the headwater of the Great 
Ruaha River – itself forming a major sub-basin of the Rufiji River (van Koppen et al. 2004:vii). 
The catchment may be broadly divided into a surrounding high escarpment, the lower slopes, 
and a central plain, also named the Usangu Plains (van Koppen et al. 2004:11). The Usangu 
Plains covers a total area of about 15,000km2 (URT 1995:6.1). The plain receives 600-800 mm 
average annual rainfall with a rainfall gradient of 1,500 mm on the high escarpment. Most of the 
rain falls in one season, from mid-November to May, leading to run-off flooding. The dry season 
 (Maganga 2002B:56) 
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is from June to November (van Koppen et al. 2004:11). The figure below shows the average 
rainfall from 1957-2004 in the Mbarali District, an area close to the two case villages. 
 
Mbarali Irr. Scheme Annual Rainfall
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The population that stood at 1.3 million in 1996 in the Upper Ruaha Catchment has grown 
extremely rapidly, mainly because of a continuous influx of migrants. By 1990, 55 percent of the 
population consisted of migrants from at least 20 different ethnic groups – especially cultivators 
from the southern highlands. In-migration livestock herders from central and northern Tanzania 
constituted 18 percent of the population, and today they own the majority of herds in the area. 
They are concentrated in the downstream plains. While the clans of settler-cultivators located 
upstream have kept their social structures somewhat intact in spite of Ujamaa villagisation
14
 and 
growing influence of local government, the social cohesion among dispersed communities in the 
downstream plains is weaker (van Koppen et al. 2004:11).  
 
                                                
14
 Between 1974 and 1976 the government relocated the rural population in Tanzania into 8,000 villages. Popularly 
known as Operation Vijiji, this exercise was carried out without any enabling legislation, often resulting in 
expropriating existing customary rights without establishing new ones in law. Villagisation was carried out under 
the false premise that, since all land belonged to the state, the state could allocate it and relocate the villagers as it 
wished without any legal consequences or obligation to the villagers. This exercise created the potential for many 
resource conflicts (Maganga 2002B:61).  
Source: Rujewa WBO 2007 
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Apart from the in-migration of both small-scale agriculturalists and pastoralists, competition for 
resources is exacerbated by the expropriation of land for large-scale agricultural enterprises, 
particularly rice production, wildlife conservation and power-generation projects. Agricultural 
encroachment on to pastoral lands has at times meant that critical dry season pastures have been 
lost, and herder-farmer disputes and conflicts are numerous (Maganga 2002B:51). Recently, 
irrigated land and favourable markets for irrigated crops have triggered the demand for water 
further. While price for the original non-irrigated crops such as coffee and pyrethrum fell, prices 
and markets for irrigated vegetables and maize improved (van Koppen et al. 2004:11).  
 
9.1 The Case Villages 
As mentioned, the two case villages, Mawindi and Isunura, are used as empirical information 
and the table below shows the main characteristics of these villages. Throughout the analysis, I 
supplement the field data with secondary empirical information in order to validate my own 
findings and elaborate on the assumptions drawn.  
 
 Mawindi Isunura 
 
Population 2007 
 Men 
 Women 
1886  
984  
902  
1932  
828  
1104  
Previous population  2006: 1812  2004: 1675  
Pastoralists:  72 124 
Cultivators:  1096 894 
Total no of cows  2350 1756  
Water points 2 pump-wells at the schools 
(merely for school children, one 
has been broken for the past year, 
the other broke while I was there) 
Build by Danida in 2003/04 
Kioga River for domestic use, 
cattle and irrigation 
8 taps and 6 self-constructed 
wells. Danida constructed the taps 
in 1886/87. (The villagers pay to 
the village council who pay a 
technician to fix them).  
Kioga River for irrigation and 
cattle.  
 
 
In both villages, rice irrigation is the main water user. The villagers only practice wet season 
agriculture. They crow rice, maize and groundnuts and most of the villagers grow all three crops. 
Rice is irrigated with water from the river whereas maize and groundnuts are rainfed. As shown 
there is also a large number of pastoralists. Though it seems that there are no families that are 
exclusively pastoralists. All the pastoralists interviewed are men, but some of them are also 
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farmers or their wives practice agriculture. The two villages are ethnically heterogeneous, but 
ethnicity does not seem to be an important issue to the villagers, nor is there any distinction 
between the different ethnic groups regarding laws and norms. The main ethnicity in the villages 
are: Hehe, Benga, Sangu and Maasai. The villages distinguish themselves from the Usangu area 
in general in that no immigration has occurred (Field data). 
 
As demonstrated in the table, the villagers of Mawindi village mainly get water from the river for 
domestic use, although for emergencies a small amount may be taken from the hand-pump wells 
at the schools. On my first visit to Mawindi village one of the pumps was broken and on my 
second visit the other pump had broken down as well.  
 
In Isunura, the villagers get water for domestic use from the self-constructed “wells”. These 
“wells” are merely big holes in the ground. The wells can only be used during the dry season, as 
the water becomes too filthy in the wet season. A group of people living close together will 
decide where to dig a well taking convenience and water level into consideration. Usually there 
are 20-30 houses sharing one well and only some of them help digging the well, but everyone in 
the village may use it.  
“The houses living close together decide the construction of the wells. They choose the location 
according to convenience and to the water level. There are 20 houses for the well she uses. Only 
some of them helped dig it, but everyone in the village may use it. Two pastoralists use the well, 
and usually they take the water up from the well and to their cattle, and then there is no 
problem” (Int. no 21). 
 
In addition, the villagers of Isunura get water from the taps installed by Danida in the late 
80’ties. There is a maximum of 20litres of water per day per person, but there is far from always 
water in the taps. At the time when I was there, I was told that there is only water in the taps 
twice a month. When the taps were installed a Water Committee was formed in order to deal 
with any problems with the taps (Field data). The Water Committee and the 20litres limitation of 
water extraction were established by encouragement of Danida and as such this rule is an 
example of how donor law has been adopted by local community. 
 
Furrow irrigation is an old phenomenon in the Usangu Plains, especially the Sangu people are 
known for having grown maize, millet, tobacco and vegetables in small, irrigated gardens before 
colonial times (URT 1995: IV, 1.12). Today, the only irrigated crop is rice, the other two main 
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crops; maize and groundnuts are rainfed. The irrigation takes place through irrigation channels 
the villagers construct themselves (Field data). Until recently the need for cash for construction 
and maintenance of irrigation furrows has been relatively small, but with the increasing use of 
furrows comes a growing need for cement off-takes, building gates and so on and as a result an 
increased demand for cash to buy material (Carlsson 2003:200). In Mawindi and Isunura the 
villagers are largely incapable of financing the sufficient amount of materials for improving the 
irrigation channels, and thus state that it is a substantial problem that the channels fracture or 
cave in (Field data).  
 
The farmers in Mawindi and Isunura exclusively practice wet season agriculture, as they are 
dependent on the rain to water their crops. During the dry season there is no water in the river 
and the rainfall is too sparse to rely on for cultivation. During the wet season the rainfall varies 
considerably though, and sometimes the villagers experience flooding and other times water 
scarcity (Field data).  
 
However, in 2003 it was observed that in the Usangu Plains there was no problem of water 
scarcity during the wet season, even in the dry years (Sokile, Kashaigili and Kadigi 2003:1016). 
This contradictory finding indicates a change in the climate and is supported by the fact that the 
majority of the respondents claimed that water scarcity has increased during the last five years 
due to diminished rainfall (Field data).  
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Chapter 10 Formal institutional framework 
The Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974 is the main piece of legislation in 
Tanzania regulating rivers, streams and internal lakes. The law regulates access and pollution by 
those abstracting water directly from controlled waters. Under this law, the prominent Water 
Right holders include: large-scale farmers; those irrigating their lands; hydroelectric Power 
Stations; Industries; Mining concerns (Maganga et al. 2004:2). The law has an elaborate system 
of controls ranging from declaring all water to be the property of the Republic, to designation of 
waters as ‘National Waters’ and ‘Regional Waters’. Furthermore, the Act divides the country 
into drainage basins under Basin Water Boards. Also, the Act furnishes an elaborate system of 
Water Rights. The system of water rights is the means through which water extractions, and uses 
and diversion are brought under regulative regimes of law. Harvesting and use of rainwater is not 
subject to any restriction by the Government (Maganga 2002A:3). Nor does the law regulate 
people abstracting water for domestic use (Maganga et al. 2004:2).  
 
The Water Utilisation Act states that people cannot have private ownership over water sources. 
They can obtain rights to use water by acquiring a water permit, which gives them legal license 
to use but not own water. Water permits are issued in consideration of the needs of the applicant 
and the expected benefits of the proposed water use. The act requires the applicant to state the 
use of water, amount required, and period of use, among other needs. The water use right is 
classified in order of priority whereby water for domestic purposes is given the highest priority, 
followed by livestock use, irrigation, industry, power generation and mining. Once a water right 
is acquired, an individual is supposed to pay taxes, which are water user fees, billed to him or her 
depending on how much extraction is allowed (Nkonya 2006:55, 56). According to the database 
in the Rufiji Basin Water Office in Iringa, by mid-2003 the government had issued 990 water 
rights in the entire Rufiji basin, with 40 percent held by governmental agencies, 12 percent by 
Brooke Bond Tea Company, and 8 percent by various Catholic dioceses. The remaining 40 
percent of registered users include private irrigation schemes (van Koppen et al. 2004:12).  
 
In the following chapters, I explain the structure the Basin Water Boards, Wards, Village 
Councils, and Water Users Associations in order to create an overview of how the formal 
institutional frameworks functions. The figure illustrates how the various sectors are connected.  
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Institutional Framework for Water Resources Management 
(Source: Irringa Water Basin Office Nov. 2007) 
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10.1 Basin Water Boards 
The Basin Water Boards (BWBs) are an important water management and pollution control 
mechanism under the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974. As shown in the 
figure the Basin Water Boards refers directly to the Ministry responsible for water. BWBs were 
before the 1981 amendment of the Act of 1974 known as Regional Water Advisory Boards. A 
‘water basin’ is defined as any area of land delimited and declared by the Minister under section 
7 of the Act 1974 to be a water basin in relation to any river or other water source. Basin Water 
Boards are supposed to be established in respect of each water basin declared by the Minister – 
and for each Basin Water Board, the minister responsible for Water Development matters 
appoint not less than 7 nor more than 10 person to be members of that Basin Water Board 
(Maganga 2002A:2-3). See appendix two for the functional responsibilities for water resources 
management.  
 
The BWB is the principal advisory organ in matters relating to the utilisation of water and 
regulation of pollution. The Board advises the Regional Water Office (RWO) on all maters 
concerning the appointment of regional water supplies, the determination, diminution or 
modification of water rights, measures to be taken in case of drought and priorities to be given. 
Basin Water Boards have substantial potentials for management of conflicts over water resources 
(Maganga 2002A:4). 
 
In 1995, the World Bank and Danida funded a Rapid Water Resources Assessment as part of a 
comprehensive Water and Sanitation Sector Review. The assessment highlighted the increasing 
competition for water resources in the Rufiji and Pangani basins, noting the growing demand for 
water irrigation and domestic use. In addition, the assessment noted that there were considerable 
conflicts between upstream irrigators and downstream hydropower generation. In order to 
manage water resource in the Rufiji Basin, the Rufiji Basin Water Office was established after 
the inauguration of the Basin Water Board in 1993. The main objectives of the office are firstly 
to act as principal executors of the Act and to carry out research pertaining to water resources 
management in the Rufiji River Basin (Maganga 2002A:4). 
 
Farmers in the Rufiji basin view basin management suspiciously and consider it as an effort to 
safeguard Tanzania Electric Company, the power generating company’s (TANESCO) interest in 
reserving sufficient water for hydropower (Maganga 2002A:5). Furthermore, there is a fear 
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among villagers that outsiders with no interest in water resources management may be appointed 
to the Basin Boards. After noting that the Rufiji basin is too vast, the Basin Board has initiated 
sub catchment-based water boards. These boards will assist the Basin Board in the management 
of water resources within the sub-catchment and also mediate conflicts taking place within the 
sub-catchment (Maganga et al. 2004:4). 
 
10.2 Ward 
At the sub-catchment level we find the ‘wards’. Three to seven villages make up a ward. The 
wards to do appear in the figure as they are not specifically formed for managing water, although 
they influence water management considerably, and therefore deserves to be mentioned in this 
chapter. The ward Development Committees frequently pass bylaws that impact on sanctions 
and penalties that seek to guide water allocation and quality. Each ward has a Ward Councillor. 
Ward Councillors are very influential in the villages and in water resource management. Ward 
Councillors represent the community members who elected them into power in the district 
council. Owing to their electorate, councillors, seeking to place their voters tend to be more 
informal and highly interact with informal institutions, which influence water management. 
However, it does not function perfectly, as they may also battle with popular opinions and 
sometimes counteract customary arrangements (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:6). 
The main responsibility of the ward tribunals is the maintenance of law and order within the 
ward and striking a compromise and reconciliation between disputing parties (Maganga 
2002A:62). 
 
10.3 Village Council 
The village level is the lowest tier of formal institutions in Tanzania. Each village has a village 
assembly of all adults, which elect 25 representatives to form the Village Council. The village 
council operates through three mandatory committees, which are vested with responsibilities for 
handling daily affairs of the village: (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:7). 
a. The finance, Economic and Planning Committee 
b. The Social Services and Self-reliance Committee (Water sub-committees) 
c. The Law and Order Committee  
 
The village council does not appear in the figure either as it is not specifically a part of the 
institutional framework for water. Should one attempt to place it in the figure it would be located 
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between the Water User Associations and the Sub-catchment Water Offices. This supposition is 
based on my empirical knowledge demonstrating that in case of conflicts or application for water 
rights the Water Users Associations take their disputes or applications to the Village Council 
who on behalf of the associations take the matter further to the Sub-catchment office (Field 
data).  
 
The strength and functioning of the village sub-committees differ from one village to another, 
and similarly, their specific intervention into water affairs also differ depending on the 
availability and the levels of demand in the water resource (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van 
Koppen 2005:7). 
 
10.4 Water Users Associations 
The Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act 1974 also created a novelty in the form of 
Water Users’ Associations (WUAs). Water Users’ Associations are an important conflict 
resolution tool. As for anyone else holding a water right, the association is obliged to (Maganga 
2002A:3): 
a) Return water used to the stream or body of water from which it 
was taken. 
b) Ensure that water is substantially undiminished in quantity. 
c) Ensure that water is not polluted with any matter derived from 
such use by the Associations’ Members. 
d) Ensure that water used by their respective members is, before its 
direct discharge into receiving waters, be treated as to comply with 
the prescribed Effluent and Receiving Water Standards. 
 
In the chapter 12.3 ‘Irrigation groups’ I present the water users associations existing in Mawindi 
and Isunura villages. It will appear that besides from the obligations scheduled above, a number 
of informal rules are embedded in the water users association. The role of the village councils 
will likewise be elaborated in relation to conflict resolution. The sub-catchment water office 
relevant for this study is the Rujewa Water Office and the Water Basin Office is the Iringa Water 
Basin Office. With these formal institutions in mind I proceed to explain the customary rules and 
norms for water management. 
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PART FOUR: Analysis of water management institutions 
 
This part takes on the task of presenting the customary water management institutions as well as 
the customary laws and norms of behaviour. This is done through an analysis of local conflict 
and cooperation. First, I analyse conflicts related to the three user groups: domestic users, 
pastoralists and irrigation farmers. I accentuate both conflicts within the users groups and 
between them. Next, I analyse the different forms of cooperation found in the two villages. It 
will appear that some of these are both of a formal and customary nature. Throughout the 
chapters, I draw attention to the matters of legal pluralism and power relationships with the aim 
to comprehend what effects it has in relation to water conflict and cooperation. 
 
Chapter 11 Nature of water conflicts 
In order to investigate the role of institutions in relation to conflicts and cooperation I need to 
understand the nature and causes of water conflicts and cooperation. This chapter therefore 
answers why and when conflicts occur, as well as who the actors involved are, and how the 
various conflicts are solved. I explain the conflicts occurring within the three user groups; 
domestic users, pastoralists, and irrigation farmers, before continuing to the conflicts occurring 
between the groups.  
 
11.1 Domestic users 
In both villages, it is primarily women who collect water. A household needs 120-200litres per 
day and a woman can carry 20litres at the time. The most important norm of behaviour 
concerning water withdrawal for domestic use is that each woman has to wait for her turn. This 
norm is in force whether the water collection takes place at the taps, the wells or at the riverbed. 
See the front page for a picture of the riverbed. In the case that a woman tries to get water before 
her turn at the expense of others who have waited longer than her, the others will object and it 
often leads to arguing. According to several informants it happens regularly that someone 
‘disrespects the queue’. It rarely leads to more than verbal arguing, but if improper language is 
used the offender may be sentenced to pay a fine to the person she has offended. For these more 
‘serious’ cases one of the village leaders is often involved to solve the matter and determine the 
size of the fine. The amount varies from 2000TZS for a small offence to 5000TZS for a big 
offence (Field data). 
 
 65 
In addition, one respondent in Mawindi 
mentioned that you have to take part in 
digging the hole in the riverbed in order to 
take water from it. If you refuse to 
contribute and still collect water it may lead 
to conflict with the women who has dug the 
hole. Finally, conflicts also occur if a person 
tries to get more than the 20litres allowed 
from one of the taps in Isunura (Field data). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“There are often conflicts about tap water. There is a 20litre limit per person per day and if 
someone tries to take more than 20litres conflicts occur. The conflicts occur when there is water 
in the taps, because when there is no water there is nothing to fight over” (Int. no 18). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The customary laws concerning water for domestic use in Mawindi and Isunura village are very 
similar to the customary laws of the Sukuma people in the Bariadi District, northern Tanzania. 
As shown in the box on the next page the Sukuma people stipulate that membership in a 
community ensures the right to access and use of the communal water resources because all 
natural water resources are owned in common by all members of the tribe or community, thus no 
one can be denied access to water for domestic use (Nkonya 2006:56). 
Pump well in Mawindi  
Water tap in Isunura Well for domestic use in Isunura 
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In relation to the above description of the customary laws of the Sukuma people, my attention is 
drawn to the fact that if a person develops a personal water source, the person is expected to 
share the water with neighbours, friends and relatives. In Mawindi village one of the informants 
had paid two men to dig a well behind her house because she found it very time and energy 
consuming to collect water in the riverbed. I estimate that the well was about 40meters deep, but 
due to the low water level in Mawindi there was no water in it. Had there been water in it 
though, it would have been her personal well and she would not have been obliged to share the 
water with other people, nor did her neighbours seem to have expected her to (Interview no. 9).  
 
The disparity between my observation in Mawindi village and the Sukuma customary laws in 
Bariadi District shows that customary laws do not necessarily agree. Whether the disparity in this 
example is rooted in ethnicity or geographical location is unknown. The important thing is, that 
in spite of the existence of various ethnic groups in the two case villages, they seem to share a 
Discussion with Sukuma elders revealed that water is a gift from God; hence water is 
regarded as a common pool resource and should be free for everyone. No one can be denied 
access to a water resource for domestic use regardless of the water source. It does not matter 
whether the water is from a natural or developed source, or whether the water is situated on 
private or public land. Due to this custom water vending among the Sukuma is not a 
common practice unless it is for cattle. It is the custom of the Sukuma people to share water 
with their neighbors, friends and relatives (here after referred to as social networks). 
However, respondents reported that free water access to private sources by this social 
network is normally limited to water for human consumption. If members of a social 
network need additional water for animals, building, irrigation or other uses, they are 
expected to pay for the water or go to public sources. In the case where a person owns land 
that is located by the water source, he will have private rights to the land but not to the 
water that is found on the land. If a person develops a private water source, he or she is 
expected to share the water with members of social networks. Thus, it is the custom of the 
Sukuma that no one can restrain anybody from using a water source for human 
consumption regardless of whether the water source is private or public (Nkonya 2006:56). 
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common customary understanding of do’s and don’ts and I suspect this to be a large part of the 
reason as to why there are relatively few serious or violent water conflicts.   
 
11.1.2 The restraining and enabling nature of domestic water institution 
Because water for domestic use constitutes a CPR regime, everyone can withdraw water freely 
within the agreed rules and norms. As for the construction of the two hand-pump wells and the 
taps, Danida is the ‘provider’ and the villagers were thought to be the ‘producers’ and be in 
charge of the maintenance of the wells and taps. However, they have difficulties raising the 
money needed for the maintenance. Formal water rights are as explained not granted for 
domestic use, but it is apparent that each individual actor has a use right, and for water extraction 
from the taps there is a maximum of litres connected to the use right. As such the actors decide 
over the resource units, but the decision-making right over the water as a resource system is 
commonly shared by the community and inherent in the customary rules and norms. In 
opposition to the Sukuma example, I did not observe anyone who made use of the right to make 
an income from water. The only rules for extraction of water for domestic purposes are of a 
customary nature. 
 
In my opinion, the management of water for domestic use is an invisible institution consisting of 
relatively few and clear rules. See chapter 5.5 ‘Customary and formal institutions’ for a 
definition of customary institutions as “a complex of norms and behaviour that are accepted by 
the community and persist over time serving collectively valued purposes”. The institution is 
created by the norms regarding water management and enables the extraction of water by 
securing all people equal access to water. In addition, the limit of 20 litres serves to assure 
availability of water for all. Simultaneously, it constrains the actors because they have to oblige 
to the existing norms and rules, and are not free to do as they please in relation to water 
extraction. When someone breaks the rules the institution makes sure that the offender is 
punished (forced to pay a fine) and the possible victim receives financial compensation. This 
challenges Maganga’s (2002B) explanation in chapter 5.5 ‘Customary and formal institutions’ 
concerning the enforcement of customary laws through the use of sanctions such as expulsion 
from the community, ostracism by friends and neighbours, or loss of reputation. I do not reject 
that these forms of enforcement may also take place, but I find it interesting that the fine system 
is not mentioned. This could indicate that the customary ‘fine system’ is a fairly new initiative, 
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and it may very well have been influenced by the formal fine system. However, on the 
customary level, the size of fines is fluid and context specific.  
 
I believe that this kind of institution may also be seen as a form of cooperation, in the sense that 
the common aim is to secure water access and availability for all domestic users. When one 
person breaks the rule at the expense of other actors (fail to cooperate) the mutual trust and 
interdependence is put in a vulnerable position. Thus, the institution aims to preserve cooperation 
and amity in society.  
  
Waiting for one’s turn is a norm of behaviour accepted in many societies around the world, and 
the fact that a person showing opportunistic behaviour occasionally breaks this norm is likewise 
universally experienced. I failed to elaborate on why some women on occasion choose to risk the 
anger of the other women in order to get water before their turn, but I imagine they may find it 
necessary in order to collect all the water needed for the day or they have other time consuming 
chores waiting. Evidently, they reckon that the possible cost is worth the winnings. As 
characteristic for all customary institutions, the rules are not written down. They seem to be so 
commonly accepted and deeply rooted in the societies that a written document would be 
superfluous. The most prevalent customary law concerning domestic use is evidently ‘living 
customary law’ in that it is inherent in the customs and everyday practices of the people, and 
only in more severe conflicts the customary laws of the authorities are applied.  
 
An interesting issue is that the tap water in Isunura leads to conflicts. When there is no water in 
the taps obviously there is nothing to fight over. It seems that when the water is finally there 
everyone is so eager to get some of the relatively clean water, that they are much more willing to 
show opportunistic behaviour.  
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11.2 Irrigation farmers 
Conflicts often occur when an upstream irrigation farmer is (perceived as) taking more water 
than he/she is supposed to, leaving insufficient water for the downstream irrigation farmers. It 
seems to be rather subjective though, how much water is too much. During interviews upstream 
farmers who had been accused of withdrawing too much water would explain that the real 
problem was not that they were using too much water, but that there was too little water in the 
river, and that they themselves too had reduced their water consumption due to the decreased 
availability. Due to the geographical nature of water flowing first through upstream fields and 
then through downstream fields there is a given power relationship between the up-streamers and 
downs-streamers (Field data).  
 
In the cases where a downstream farmer suspects that an upstream farmer is withdrawing too 
much water, the first step is to address the up-streamer and discuss the matter. According to the 
informants it has occurred a few times that violent conflicts has taken place between the involved 
actors. The second step is to involve either someone from the irrigation group concerned 
(typically the chairman) or one of the representatives from the village governement. The third 
step is to have the matter discussed at a village council meeting. According to the informants no 
one has ever involved the Water Office in Rujewa or the police in water irrigation conflicts. I 
found this interesting and tried to figure out whether there is no tradition for involving outside 
authorities in local conflicts. However, it turned out that in relation to cow theft the villagers 
would not hesitate to involve the police. Furthermore, I was informed by the water basin officer 
in Rujewa that he had indeed been in contact with a farmer from Isunura on several occasions 
regarding issues related to an irrigation canal (Field data). The fact that an individual chose to go 
to the water authorities for help instead of discussing it with the village leaders, which according 
to the water basin officer he had not done, indicates that the complainant considered the formal 
conflict resolution to be more likely to solve the matter in a way he would find beneficiary. This 
is thus a clear example of ‘forum shopping’ because the complainant, instead of complying with 
the customary rules, chose to make use of the formal rules. Unfortunately, I was prevented from 
interviewing the complainant because his name was classified. An elaboration of general conflict 
resolution takes place in chapter 11.8 
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The Usangu Plains is far from the only area in Tanzania where conflicts over irrigation water 
occur.  
“Irrigation practices in the Pangani Basin have a long history and to most farmers in the basin 
water is their lifeblood. This has been necessitated by the variability of rainfall in most parts of 
the basin. In recent decades however, conflicts over water uses have been on the increase. This 
has been prompted by rapid population increase and expansion of farming land, leading to an 
increase in demand and use of water. In addition, inefficiencies in the traditional furrows have 
also contributed to the shortage of water” (Mwamfupe 2001:73). 
 
The matter of rule breaking in relation to irrigation farming is likewise a common problem in the 
Meru area in northeastern Tanzania. First, there is the matter of theft of water from the rivers. 
This involves tampering with the off-take and diverting more water from the river than the 
amount stipulated in the water right. Second, there is the issue of small-scale water users 
organized in water committees, irrigating with water from furrows belonging to estate holders or 
putting pressure on the estate holders to share their water allocation with the small-scale water 
users. Third, there is water theft committed by one water committee member taking water from 
another, weaker member (Carlsson 2003:210). 
 
In the two case villages none of the informants knew how much water they are formally allowed 
to withdraw, thus it is difficult to make a statement about theft of water according to the allowed 
amount. As mentioned the discussions about use of water largely take place between up-
streamers and down-streamers, not between the water authorities (water office staff) and the 
irrigation farmers. This thesis deals with water management on village level. Had the scope of 
the thesis been a bit wider and the timeframe not so limited, it would have been very interesting 
to apply a broader perspective and include issues such as conflicts between small-scale water 
users and estate holders. As mentioned in chapter 3.3 ‘Water scarcity’, conflicts occur in the 
Usangu Plains between TANESCO and irrigation farmers. In addition, conflicts between 
irrigation and conservation of natural wetlands have been observed (Kashaigili 2003:839). I will 
not go further into these, but merely mention them to indicate that conflicts over water are by far 
not restricted to village level. As for the third type of theft mentioned above, one example may 
be that of an upstream farmer (powerful member) taking water from a downstream farmer. Apart 
from this example I have not observed any conflicts between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ irrigation 
farmers.  
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As explained, the most common conflict between irrigation farmers in the two case villages is a 
matter of water extraction, more precisely the division of water between upstream and 
downstream farmers. Due to the geographical location of their fields, the upstream farmers are in 
a powerful position. In order to defend their right to water, the farmers largely make use of the 
customary institutions, and only on rare occasion the formal institutions. I my opinion, this 
chapter about the irrigation farmers illustrates that conflicts are not inherently bad in that they in 
this case may serve to reach an equal division of water, in the sense that conflicts may lead to 
discussion which may lead to change. I do not presume that claims are always handled in a fair 
manner, however it is not the purpose of this thesis to estimate who is right or wrong, but rather 
to investigate the dynamics between the actors. In chapter 12.1 I examine biases in village 
governments.  
 
 
Irrigation fields  
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11.3 Pastoralists 
The pastoralists do as a rule not utilize the same wells as the domestic users. In general, the 
pastoralists who have a large number of cattle dig a well for their own personal use while 
pastoralists with a smaller amount of cattle may share a well together with other pastoralists. The 
number of cattle per person varies greatly, a pastoralist may have as little as two cows or as 
many as 200. According to the pastoralists in Mawindi and Isunura a cow needs about 40litres of 
water per day and therefore they generally let the cattle drink directly from the well rather than 
carrying up the needed water. The pastoralists are settled in the villages and merely take their 
cattle out of the villages for grazing during the day and return in the evening. During the wet 
season supplying the cattle with water is fairly easy as they can find small ‘lakes’ in the area, but 
during the dry season they are dependent on their own wells (Field data).  
 
 A day in the dry season: “Me and the cattle leave around 8 in the morning to go and find 
pastures in a far away forest. We then come back around 13 to have water. Then we leave again 
and return in the evening around 18 (the cattle does not need water in the evening). There is no 
way to find water in the forest so we have to come back. I never take my cattle to another village 
for water. In the wet season we do not have to walk so far to find pasture and we don’t have to 
come back for water, because there will be water all over” (Int. no 25). 
 
The pastoralists believe that they are in a much more difficult situation than the cultivation 
farmers, because farming only takes place during the wet season, whereas they have to supply 
their cattle with water year round. For nomadic pastoralists getting access to water may comprise 
a substantial challenge, although due to the settlement of the pastoralists in Mawindi and 
Isunura, they enjoy largely the same right to water as other people. However, I learned that the 
government has taken several steps to divide the pastoralists from the remaining part of the 
village. One of these steps is the law declaring that no cattle are allowed inside the villages. This 
implies a location of all pastoralists on the outskirts of the villages, since they have to live close 
to their cattle in order to avoid cattle theft (Field data). I elaborate on the relationship between 
the pastoralists and the government shortly.  
“Pastoralists are not allowed to have cows in the village (plan of the government to separate 
settlement/cows/fields) and therefore they have the cows and the wells outside of the village. The 
wells are only used by pastoralists. There are cows in town but they will have to move out soon. 
This plan of the government started this year and is partly to avoid conflicts. I think the plan is a 
good idea because when the cows where in town they would go and eat other people beans and 
stuff and then the owner would have to pay a fine. Even before they were told to move out of the 
village the pastoralists had their own wells and there were no conflicts. The pastoralists decided 
this because when the cows go in to the wells they make the water dirty and that is not good for 
the domestic users” (Int. no 25). 
 73 
In times of water scarcity, a pastoralist may choose to take his cattle for watering at another 
pastoralists’ well or the cattle may wonder off accidentally. There is also the option that a 
pastoralist may ask for permission in advance and be granted the right to use another well for 
watering his cattle. In the cases where no permission has been given in advance, the “owner” of 
the well can choose to forgive the offender or he may give him a fine. If he estimates that his 
well has suffered damage from the intrusion. It is entirely up to the well owner how much the 
fine should be. Furthermore, it is practice that the offender cleans up in the well if his cattle have 
made it dirty. If they cannot solve it between themselves they ask the chairman from the 
pastoralist group or a village leader to settle the matter. These conflicts occur exclusively in the 
dry season, as there is sufficient water during the wet season (Field data). 
“Conflicts happen if a person takes his cows to another pastoralists well. They may only use the 
ones they have built themselves. Last week my son was watching the cattle and they went to 
another persons well, and I had to pay a fine of 10.000TZS for all the 18 cows. The well was 
close to the pastures and therefore the cows just wandered off. Sometimes people can ask for 
forgiveness and then they don’t have to pay a fine. We don’t like to involve the police or villages 
leaders and it never happened that they had to. It has never happened that someone has taken 
their cattle to my well” (Int. no 32). 
 
11.4 Conflicts between pastoralists and domestic users 
Pastoralists are not allowed to take their cattle into the wells used by domestic users. The simple 
reason for this is that if the cows enter the wells sand falls in and the water gets dirty, in worst 
case the well might collapse. The pastoralists may get water from a domestic well, but if they 
need to take their cattle into the well instead of carrying the water up, they must use their own 
wells. For the pastoralists who own a large number of cattle it is not possible to carry up such a 
big amount of water. Most people told us that the pastoralists have their own wells and are 
therefore not a problem to domestic water users (Field data).  
“The pastoralists are a problem to themselves but not to other people. They have too little water 
for their cattle and are only allowed to use their own wells, as they are not allowed to use other 
wells they are not a problem to other people” (Int. no 22). 
 
However, as previously mentioned by Ostrom opportunistic behaviour may take place in all 
societies and Mawindi and Isunura are no exceptions. If a pastoralist has difficulty supplying his 
cattle with water he may choose to break this rule if he weighs that the benefit (the watering of 
the cattle) is higher than the possible cost (paying a fine). There is, of course, the chance that he 
may not get caught and thus he may get away with the offence without any expenses. According 
to one informant, some pastoralists would take their cattle to the places in the river used by 
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domestic users after dark, and then the domestic users would have no chance to know who had 
made the water dirty and thus no opportunity to punish the offender. As regards the fines, it is 
always the victim (unless a village authority is involved) that determines the amount of the fine 
and there are no written regulations regarding the fine amounts.  
“There are conflicts between pastoralists and domestic users because the pastoralists sometimes 
take their cattle down into the wells. Then the water gets dirty and the domestic users complain, 
however we understand that if the cattle get no water it might die. We solve the conflicts 
ourselves. There are 3 wells for the pastoralists but that is not enough water for all the cattle” 
(Int. no 21). 
 
11.5 Conflicts with pastoralists from other villages 
One may suspect that water conflicts between pastoralists from different villages also occur. 
However, for Mawindi and Isunura this is generally not the case. The surrounding villages are 
situated so far apart that is it impossible for the pastoralists to walk this distance with their cattle. 
Furthermore, the government has issued a law declaring that is prohibited to use the water 
sources of a different village. However, one respondent mentioned a conflict between Isunura 
and Manienga (another village in the Usangu Plains) that occurred a while back (Field data). 
“Sometimes there can be conflicts between pastoralists of different villages. A pastoralist is not 
allowed to take his cattle to other villages without asking permission, if he does, it may cause 
conflicts. It doesn’t happen often though. Last year such a conflict took place between Manienga 
and Isunura. The village leaders of the two villages got together and solved the conflict by 
agreeing that each person has to take water for his cattle in his own village, and the person who 
took his cattle to the other village had to pay a fine” (Int. no. 1). 
 
The conflict resolution that took place in this case thus served as a creation, or at least 
clarification, of a new rule stating that all pastoralists may only withdraw water from the sources 
in his village. This supports the theoretical notion of resource mechanisms and shows how the 
pressure on a resource and the (equal) power relationship between two villages can lead to 
change and adaptation/creation of laws.  
 
11.6 Conflicts between pastoralists and irrigation farmers 
One may also imagine that water conflicts between pastoralists and irrigation farmers take place.  
Several studies depict users conflicts between these two groups, for example Kashaigili et al. 
2003 who have observed conflicts in the Usangu Basin. 
“In Tanzania, the conflicts between irrigators and pastoralists or irrigators and the environment 
are becoming alarming. Examples include the existing conflicts between irrigation and 
conservation of natural wetlands in Usangu Basin” (Kashaigili et al. 2003:839). 
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In addition, user conflicts have been reported as early as back to 1996 due to an in-migration of 
pastoralists in the Usangu Plains. 
“Already in 1995 conflicts over water were reported between old and new settlers as well as 
agriculturalists and pastoralists. In-migration of pastoralists, especially to the Central parts of 
the Usangu Plains, brought the number of cattle up from 400,000 to 1,000,000 over a short 
period and was considered to be threatening the ecosystem” (URT 1995:1.8). 
  
However, in Mawindi and Isunura villages the pastoralists and the irrigation farmers use 
different water sources. The farmers withdraw water from the river for their fields whereas 
pastoralists in the wet season get water from lakes and ponds and during the dry season from 
their own wells. Although I cannot reject that user conflict between the two groups may occur 
over access to land. In fact, I learned that conflicts between different pastoralists over grazing 
areas take place from time to time. However, as this study centres on water conflicts I have left 
this perspective out. 
 
11.7 Eviction of pastoralists 
The fact that there are few conflicts between pastoralists and irrigation farmers may be due to the 
eviction of pastoralists that has been carried out the area. In order to protect the environment the 
government introduced a maximum limit of 200 cattle per person as of November 2006. 
Pastoralists exceeding this amount had the choice of moving some of the cattle to the coast or to 
sell them. They were offered no compensation. As previously mentioned it was in addition 
agreed that it was no longer allowed to keep cattle inside a village’s boundaries. The government 
is trying to organize cultivation, pastoral farming and settlement into three separate areas. 
According to our respondents, the number of cattle owned by the villagers has reduced 
considerably since the introduction of the new governmental plan. The ones who were already 
below the 200 limit were happy about the plan while the ones who had to sell or move were very 
dissatisfied (Field data). 
“I am 48 years and have always lived here. I am Maasai. I had 300 cows before the 
government’s law was implemented, then I moved 150 of the cows to Lindy and now have 150 
cows here. They were moved to Lindy by truck, it is about 1000km. I think the plan was a bad 
idea because I like having a lot of cows. Some of my children look after the cattle in Lindy. The 
plan came so suddenly I did not have time to sell any of my cows. It started November last year. 
Only one person moved from the village, some just moved their cattle” (Int. no. 30). 
 
As for keeping cattle outside of the villages most people seemed to agree that it is a good idea in 
order to avoid the cows wandering off eating other people’s household crops. However, living on 
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the outskirts makes them more vulnerable to water supply. This was already observed by a 
Danida sponsored study carried out in 1995. 
“A number of villages visited are included in the Danida Water Project, however, the water 
points are mainly based in the more densely populated parts of the villages, which means that 
the people living in the outskirts of the villages have to fetch water in the rivers and streams in 
the area or to dig wells. The people especially affected by this are the agro-pastoral and pastoral 
people and their herds. Due to the need for grazing areas around the homesteads for livestock 
kept close to homes for provision or milk, meat ect for the daily needs of the family such 
households usually live in the ‘bush’ areas of the villages. Water is a big problem in these areas 
especially during the last part of the dry season as streams and river very often dry up” (URT 
1995: IV, 3.3). 
 
 
Tanzania is not the only country where pastoralists are in a vulnerable situation. In many African 
countries pastoralists’ way of life in the (semi-) arid grasslands is governed and protected by 
customary law that gives them grazing rights and rights of access to water (Scoones 1995). 
However, often pastoralist communities do not have formal rights over land and hence no formal 
rights over water, too. This makes life for them extremely difficult under conditions in which 
states intend to impose formal statutory law and statal control over all the state territory and the 
‘citizens’. Furthermore the competition over scarce resources between different pastoralists 
groups and between pastoralists and sedentary farmers increases due to factors such as 
population growth, extension of farmland and increase in numbers of livestock. Pastoralists are 
‘difficult citizens’ in the view of state authorities, because they are difficult to control, tend to 
ignore state boundaries and cling to their customary ways, which inter alias include the notion of 
carrying arms for the defence of their livestock. Hence state authorities are often biased to the 
detriment of pastoralists in cases of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers or other groups. 
Furthermore, state authorities ignore customary rights of pastoralists with regard to water and 
declare state ownership of water resources that are of vital importance to pastoralists, thus 
opening access to water resources that traditionally were only used by pastoralists (Böge 
2003:37). 
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11.8 Conflict resolution 
The previous chapters show that the majority of conflicts are solved informally at the lower 
levels and only the more serious conflicts are taken to village authorities. This process is largely 
concordant with the six tiers identified by Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005. 
 
Six tiers are identified where informal-formal conflict resolution takes place:  
1. One to one level between the victims: both parties speak out and agree on 
resolving the conflict. 
2. Local elders level: normally those who are well known to both parties and who 
can appreciable solicit trust among the parties.  
3. Canal committee level: this is a semi-formal level since the committee members 
are in some places elected among water users and in other areas they assume 
responsibilities de facto. 
4. Customary village leaders level: there is a village reconciliatory committee 
(baraza la usuluishi), which is made up of elected/appointed elders and resides 
over local conflict, especially on resources, marriages and related cases. 
5. Ward level: the Ward tribune, while established formally through election, it 
operated according to customary principles, focusing on reconciliatory rather than 
punitive rulings. 
6. Basin and/or catchment level: the Rufiji Basin Water Office and the sub-offices 
mitigate conflicts when local solutions have failed and where the claimants do not 
wish to go to courts of law (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 2005:9). 
 
In opposition to my findings, level five and six are generally not used in practice in the two case 
villagers and the village council replaces level four. The villagers are aware of the opportunity to 
involve the ward or basin level in conflict resolution, but the majority of the conflicts they 
manage to solve at the lower levels. This is in agreement with the position that “local water 
users prefer informal routes over formal ones because they feel a greater sense of identity and 
hope for justice than they would experience in the courts of formal law where decisions are 
based on ‘I loose-you-win’ or vice versa principles” (Sokile, Mwaruvanda and van Koppen 
2005:9). Moreover, customary laws and institutions are viewed to be more influential in water 
and land allocation and more successful in managing rural water resources than imposing formal 
laws (Nkonya 2006:53). Another reason that the villagers omit to involve the formal authorities 
 78 
may be knowledge uncertainty. As implied the villagers do not understand why they have to pay 
a water fee and find it unreasonable. This confusion and discontent infects their relationship with 
the formal authorities and they are thus unlikely to involve them as conflict resolution partners.   
 
11.9 Sub conclusion 
In summarising, conflicts do generally not occur because people have different interests, as the 
conflicts mainly occur within the same user groups, but it is rather a matter of first-order scarcity 
and opportunistic behaviour. As explained in chapter 3.3 ‘Water scarcity’ first-order scarcity is a 
matter of not having enough water and in the majority of the cases it is a supply-induced scarcity 
as the rivers simply run dry and the water level in the wells decreases. In my opinion, the ‘social 
resource scarcity’ is very low, if any, because the customary institutions efficiently solve the 
conflicts. However, this may only be the superficial picture, there is a possibility of some 
underlying power relationships. As mentioned, the government has evicted several pastoralists 
from the area and evidence suggests that other groups of people may be marginalized as well.  
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Nature of conflicts in Mawindi and Isunura villages  
Actors involved Causes Resolution 
Domestic users vs. domestic 
users 
- Failing to wait in line 
- Taking more than the 20litres 
allowed 
- Neglecting to contribute to 
well digging 
Largely discussions between 
the actors involved, and in 
cases of improper language 
and offence involvement of 
village authorities and possibly 
issuing of a fine 
Irrigation farmers vs. irrigation 
farmers 
- Division of river water for 
irrigation, largely between 
upstream farmers and 
downstream farmers 
Discussions between the actors 
involved and in the next place 
involvement of representatives 
from irrigation groups, or in 
last case the village council 
Pastoralists vs. pastoralists - The use of other wells 
without permission 
Discussions between the actors 
involved, rebuilding of wells, 
issuing of afine and in last case 
involvement of representatives 
from pastoralists groups or 
other village authorities 
Pastoralists vs. domestic users - Breaking the rule that no 
cows are allowed to enter wells 
or water holes in the river bed 
Discussions between the actors 
involved, reconstruction of 
wells issuing of fine, 
involvement of village 
authorities 
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Chapter 12 Nature of cooperations 
In this chapter, I analyse the nature of various forms of cooperation existing in the case villages. 
This is done through an explanation of the local water management institutions. I have referred 
several times to the role of the village councils and village authorities in relation to conflict 
resolution, and I therefore begin this chapter by characterizing the village government. Next, I 
describe the pastoralist groups and the irrigation groups. In extension of the irrigation groups I 
examine the matter of water right and division of water, as these two phenomenons are part of 
the irrigation institution.   
 
12.1 The village governments 
The village government is the highest institutional decision-making unit on local level. The 
figure on the next page illustrates the structure of Isunura village government. The structure of 
Mawindi village government is identical except that a Defence and Security Committee 
substitute the Law and Order Committee. The villagers select the large majority of the 
representatives in the village government, however, the government appoints the ‘village 
executive officer’ and whereas the other members are selected for a period of five years, the 
governmental representative is selected on a permanent basis. In the analysis of the various 
conflicts it is clear that the village government is only involved when the matters are too great 
for the actors themselves to solve. Besides from the conflict resolution role, the village 
government also strives to decrease first order water scarcity, which as mentioned is the main 
trigger of conflicts in the two villages. This is done by educating the villagers about efficient 
water use and encouraging sustainable water management (Field data).  
 
Through the interviews with the villagers as well as the representatives from the village 
government, I was given the impression that in relation to conflict resolution, the government 
functions well. However, one informant in Mawindi complained that financial contributions had 
been made to the village government three years ago in order to improve water facilities in the 
village, yet no improvements have been made (Interview 2). When I confronted one of the 
representatives from the village government, he said that it was correct that the village 
government had made a collection, but he was unaware of what had happened with the money 
(Interview 11). This indicates that the village governments may have some weaknesses. My 
empirical data do not reveal this matter, but a study carried out in 1993 in seven Tanzanian 
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districts (22 villages) suggests a number of weaknesses in the village governments (Ngware and 
Haule 1993).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of these weaknesses is the lack of basic management, leadership skills and a top-down 
approach in decision-making and poor communication on decisions made. Furthermore, the 
study observes conflicts and misunderstandings among village/ward and district levels, which 
have a negative impact on the running of village governments. There is a general unawareness of 
the leaders and villagers of the existence, roles and responsibilities of the village government, 
caused by non-involvement of people in the establishment of such government. In addition, the 
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village governments are characterised by a lack of power to enforce bylaws and the 
fundamentals of power, authority and autonomy of village governments are still in the hands of 
the state and not the local level. The study finds that there is a dominance of wealthy members in 
village governments and they neglect the views of the poor majority. Additionally, there is a 
serious under-representation of women and dominance of men. Overall the study concludes, that 
there is weak participatory democracy and decision-making in the village governments. 
Consequently, the legitimacy and acceptability of the village government by and among the 
people is doubtful (Ngware and Haule 1993:xii-xv). 
 
12.1.1 Wealth and gender biases 
The power relationship between wealthy and poor farmers has additionally been observed by a 
study of the Usangu Plains from 1995. 
On Usangu there is a relatively high degree of social differentiation between poor tenant 
farmers, small landowners and large, wealthy farmers, with women mainly belonging to the first 
two groups. There is a tendency for irrigation improvement and formalization of participation 
from traditional canal committees to Water Users Associations to favour the wealthy farmers, 
who are often landlords, have sufficient economic resources to be able to benefit from and carry 
the extra costs of improved irrigation, and wield the influence and knowledge to dominate formal 
users associations” (URT 1995: I, 5.5). 
 
Evidently, the gap between wealthy and poor depends on the level of investigation. Looking at 
the Usangu Plains as a whole will reveal substantial economic differences between various 
groups of people, however applying a village perspective as in this thesis show a less varied 
picture. I regret not investigating who the villagers themselves would define as better or worse 
off and on what grounds. It would have been particularly interesting in relation to upstream and 
downstream farmers. Due to the beneficial location of upstream fields one may suspect that these 
plots belong to wealthy farmers. If this is the case, the disparity between the wealth groups may 
escalate in the future concurrently with water scarcity.  
“If there is less water in the future, only upstream farmers will be able to grow rice and the rest 
will only be able to grow maize. As rice is a better cash crop this will probably lead to more 
conflicts about water” (Int. no 20). 
 
Water will thus become increasingly valuable, and the unequal access to water will possibly 
result in more conflicts unless the institutions are capable of reaching mutually accepted 
agreements. 
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The gender bias has also been observed in other studies. Unfortunately, I am not aware of the 
gender balance in the village governments in the two case villages, but none of the 
representatives I interviewed were women.  
 “Men dominate in many of the village committees. The Water Act states that at least half of all 
Committee members must be female, but this isn’t always followed. Some Ministry of Water staff 
are of the opinion that if 65%- 100% of the Committee members were female, they would run 
along more equitable lines, with water for domestic use being prioritised above other uses such 
as irrigation” (Huggins 2003:41). 
 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that women are not only marginalized in the village committees 
but also in relation to water allocation for irrigation and in spite of the fact that household water 
provision is traditionally a female responsibility, men dominate the bottom-most planning stage. 
Overall, women are not significant decision makers in water management issues (Benedict 
1998:500, Anthony 2005:93). 
 
Based on my empirical information, I am not in a position to estimate whether these weaknesses 
and biases exist in the village governments in the two case villages. However, I find that this 
criticism raises concerns concerning the functioning of the village governments. Nevertheless, 
the village government is an important organ in the villages and the village council solves water 
conflicts that have not been solved at the lower levels.  
 
12.2 The pastoralists groups 
Many of the pastoralists in the two villages are members of a pastoralist group. The main 
incentive for becoming a member is to improve medicine supply for the cattle. The government 
supplies such groups with medicine, to some extent, whereas it is considerably more difficult 
financing medicine as an individual pastoralist. In Mawindi, there is one pastoralist group, which 
has 20 members. In Isunura there is also one group, which has 25 members. The groups also 
serve to mitigate conflicts, both between the pastoralists and other people and in between the 
pastoralists themselves (Field data). 
 
When a conflict occurs these steps are often followed: (Int. no. 13) 
1) The chairman of the pastoralist group will discuss the issue with the actors involved and 
possible ask the offender to pay a fine. 
2) If the chairman cannot solve it, the village council will discuss the issue and decide what 
needs to be done. 
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In chapter 11.3 ‘Pastoralists’ I have explained how conflicts between pastoralists may arise. 
According to the pastoralists I interviewed conflicts over water is a small problem compared to 
conflicts over pasture or cow theft. Some pastoralists even stated that no conflicts occur over 
water. Nevertheless, the pastoralists are severely affected by the seasonal water scarcity. During 
the dry season they risk that the water level in the wells decrease or even dry out. Consequently, 
they speculate on how to secure water availability all year. According to my interpreter several 
of the pastoralists plan to construct a ‘dam’. My interpreter insisted on using the word ‘dam’, 
however based on his explanation, I believe that what was meant was not a dam, as it would be 
placed outside the river and not affect people downstream, but rather some sort of reservoir. 
Currently, the pastoralists groups were saving up for such a construction but they were doubtful 
as to whether they would ever have sufficient capital. Nevertheless, their organisation in these 
groups creates a cooperation that may on the long term improve the water situation for the 
pastoralists if they succeed in constructing the reservoirs (Field data). Pastoralist groups have 
existed throughout history in many African countries often as grazing associations, but also as 
dam groups. In Botswana for example, the government launched a dam programme between 
1974 and 1980 designed to provide water for livestock. The user groups were in charge of the 
dams and management rules were devised and applied flexibly so the users were able to adapt 
the regulations to their own situation (Scoones 1995:137).   
 
 
 
 
Children taking the cattle for watering 
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12.3 The irrigation groups  
The irrigation groups or ‘Water Users Associations’ (WUA) are in charge of matters related to 
irrigation, such as water division and mending of the channels. In Mawindi there are two WUAs; 
‘Twende Pamoja’ has existed since 1997 and has 27 members. It obtained a formal water right in 
2004. The association pay 40.000TZS per year in water fee. The other WUA is ‘Nyamatwinga’ 
which has existed since 2001 with 110 members and is in the process of becoming formally 
registered. This association also pay 40.000TZS per year for a water right. In Isunura there are 
three WUAs all of them are formally registered. ‘Mfeleji’ has existed since 1984 and has 30 
members. It became registered in 2004 and pays 100.000TZS per year in water fee. The second 
WUA is ‘Iyota’ which has existed since 1980 with 76 members and became officially registered 
in 1996. The association pay a water fee of 48.000TZS last year but this year the amount has 
raised to 78.000TZS. The third group is ‘Mjabajaba’, which has existed sine 1998 and has 110 
members. See appendix three for more information about the irrigation groups.  
 
The WUAs cover different geographical areas and therefore the membership depends on the 
location of the fields of the individual members, one geographical area is controlled by one 
WUA and different area by a different WUA. The secretary of the WUAs for the specific area is 
responsible for gathering the members to mend the channels when they break, most often all the 
members take part in the mending. All members contribute financially when needed. It is a 
general rule that a new irrigation channel must never be built without asking permission of the 
WUA chairman (Field data).  
 
In the box below Maganga 2002 elaborates on the importance of customary laws in the 
construction of irrigation channels as well as for the functioning of irrigation groups. It appears 
that the so-called ‘chama’ is a traditional customary institution established in order to ensure 
cooperation between the irrigation farmers. Many irrigation groups that started as customary 
institutions now enjoy a formal status in that they have been registered with the statal authorities 
and possess a formal water right. Hence, they exemplify the interplay between customary and 
formal law. The formal water right does not override the customary water right rather the two 
rights co-exist. The water basin officer in Rujewa, Mr. Msuya explained me that the government 
has chosen to build on existing local structures in order to implement the water fee scheme with 
the aim to enhance the efficiency of the implementation (Key interview Mr. Msuya).  
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Institutions for managing irrigation water are quite common and exist throughout the world.  
 
In the Usangu Plains there are many instances where villagers organize themselves under an 
informal association, chama, in order to construct an irrigation system. A good example of such 
a ‘traditional’’ irrigation systems is found in Nyeregete village, which started in 1964 when a 
small group of villagers organized themselves to dig a canal to irrigate their farms, in order to 
complement the erratic and un-reliable rains. As they undertook the task of constructing the 
canal, no doubt the villagers were influenced by indigenous knowledge and customs related to 
water use in the area. The Sangu, who are the dominant ethnic group have laws and customs 
guiding the use of water. Under traditional laws and customs the construction of irrigation 
canals and furrows was controlled by the chief, and, although a single individual could tap a 
stream for his purpose without first consulting the chief, the latter could prohibit the 
construction or use of any such canal or furrow. Once constructed, the canal or furrow was the 
exclusive property of the people who constructed it until they abandoned it. Then it reverts to 
the chief. Over time, this tribal law has undergone some changes. Still one needs a right in 
order to use water for irrigation nowadays, but there are two ways of obtaining such a right. For 
the so-called indigenous/traditional irrigation one obtains the right as defined in customary 
regulations, which are administered in the various levels where customary law operates (local 
water committees, councils of elders, village authorities, etc.). The formal water rights, on the 
other hand, are obtained by applying to the recognized authorities. The Nyeregete canal was 
therefore constructed by referring to the customary system of obtaining irrigation water, where 
people organize themselves informally and construct a canal to divert water from Kiyoga River. 
Each member of the canal then constructed smaller furrows to tap water from the main canal to 
their fields. A single individual may initiate such canal groups, and afterwards it may grow into 
a larger Canal Committee, such as the one in Nyeregete, which, according to informants, has a 
membership of 100 and it covers a distance of about 20 miles. The Canal Committees and sub-
committees (established for each subcanal) oversee the allocation of water to members, as well 
as the maintenance of the canal. The Nyeregete Canal has to be cleaned every year during the 
months of August–December, and if a member abstains from the maintenance activities, he or 
she is liable to a fine (Maganga 2002A:5). 
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12.3.1 Water rights 
In the box Maganga makes clear that there is a significant difference between customary and 
formal water rights. I have previously explained that in order to withdraw water for productive 
purposes one has to pay a water fee, which allows the person to use a certain amount of water. 
Later, I explain the customary way of dividing water for irrigation during scarcity. As shown 
above, the irrigation groups pay a substantial amount in water fee, however, none of the 
informant knew what the money paid to the government is used for, nor did they know how 
much water they are allowed to abstract according to their water right. Several of the informants 
said there was no limit to water use, but the water basin officer in Rujewa stated on more than 
one occasion, that they knew very well how much water they were allowed to use (Field data). 
  
The formal water right are in the two case villages merely given to WUAs, thus the individual 
members do not have a water right, but as a group using the same canal they all share the same 
water right. Although, in Mawindi it appeared that many of the villagers are not familiar with the 
concept of water rights. The ones, who do know about it, find it very unfair that they (as part of a 
WUA) are forced to pay for water. In their view, the water they use for irrigation comes from the 
rainwater and the rainwater does not belong to the government (Field data). 
 
This knowledge uncertainty concerning the purpose of water fees and the limitation to water 
extraction may create conflicts between the irrigation farmers and the representatives from the 
government. In fact, studies have already documented conflicts in relation to collection of water 
fees (Maganga 2002B:61). 
 
Evidently, the government has the right to earn an income from water in form of the water fees, 
while the groups possessing a water right has the right to access and withdrawal, and merely a 
decision-making right within the frame of the entitled water. In other words, the government 
decides over the water system, and the farmers over the entitled water units. In contradiction, the 
customary way of perceiving water, is that everyone has an access and withdrawal right, and 
because the water comes from the rain, not even the government has the right to claim ownership 
(Field data). 
 
It seems that the villagers have a clear understanding of the customary water rights, however the 
formal water rights seem to be more detached from the local context. I did not observe conflicts 
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between the people possessing customary rights and formal rights, as most of the irrigation 
farmers in the two villages are members of an irrigation group and thus have a shared formal 
water right. However, previous studies have documented such conflicts in particular between 
small-holder irrigators.  
“Scarcity of water and conflicts about water were reported to be mainly in connection with 
irrigation. The most serious of such conflicts are between the ones with formal water rights and 
irrigators using water according to the indigenous system, especially between the two different 
small-holder irrigators. The intensive water use in connection with the improved small-holder 
irrigation schemes to make them economically sustainable (the heavy investments) has led to a 
situation in the study area where many traditional irrigators are facing water scarcity – and in 
some cases are not able any more to get sufficient water to fields which were previously used for 
rice cultivation” (URT 1995: I, 4.8). 
 
 
Another issue related to the financial matter of water right is the concern that it may be too heavy 
a financial burden for the poorest. I have already mentioned, that the villagers in general find it 
difficult to raise the money needed for the maintenance of the hand pump wells, which indicates 
that their financial means are severely limited. However, I did not encounter anyone who said 
that they could not afford paying a water fee. The example below from the Pangani District, 
northeastern Tanzania supports the supposition that the water fee does not seem to exclude 
irrigation farmers.  
 
When irrigation furrows are registered with the government authorities, water fees have to be 
paid to the Pangani Water Basin Office. It seems to take time before the farmers accept the 
idea that the government is now charging them for using a resource that they have never had 
to pay for. Cash is primarily collected through membership fees and fines, while all water 
committee members are compelled to supply labour for cleaning and other forms of 
maintenance and repairs. In interviews water users consider that membership fees, fines, and 
water fees, are still not too heavy a financial burden on them, not even the poorer farmers, at 
least not to the extent that they refrain from being water committee members. Because of the 
increase in off-farm incomes and the diversification in agricultural production including 
production of cash crops, the increased demand for cash appears not to exclude potential 
water users (Carlsson 2003:200). 
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12.3.2 Division of water 
During periods of water scarcity in the rainy season, the water is divided between the farmers 
according to a certain number of days. On a meeting for all members of the concerned irrigation 
group it is decided how to make the water rotations. For example, three farmers having their 
fields next to each other will receive water for three days, then another three farmers for three 
days, etc. The upstream farmers are always the first to get water, because they as mentioned are 
in a favourable geographical position. There is thus an unequal relationship between upstreamers 
and downstreamers, but I am not aware how big an impact waiting for water may lead to. The 
downstream farmers I interviewed are not happy with the water division, but explained that they 
have to accept it, because there is no other way to do it (Interview no. 28). On the other hand, I 
found it interesting that all farmers receive water for the same amount of days, regardless of the 
size of their fields.  
“In the beginning of the cultivation season the chairman and the secretary call a meeting and if 
needed divide the water by days. Water is divided equally by all members in spite of how big an 
area each member has. We also fix the channels and if necessary use some of the money to buy 
cement. All members must take part in fixing a channel, if a person fails to show up we contact 
the person to ask why he/she was not there and if there is a good explanation we forgive the 
person. It has never happened that a person has refused to help” (Int. no. 21). 
 
It is commonly agreed upon that when there is less water in the river a division of the water must 
be reached to make sure everyone gets some water and it is a commonly accepted norm that 
water must only be used according to availability, when there is less water, everyone must use 
less. This flexible norm of behaviour is used to adapt to ecological uncertainty. Sticking to the 
norm ensures some water for all, instead of more water for some and close to no water for others. 
The cooperative nature of irrigation management has also been observed by Uphoff: 
“Irrigation management confronts the problem that farmers upstream have locational advantage 
over those who are downstream and this creates at least the potential for continual conflict. 
Water users at the head of the channel or at the head of the system are in a better position to 
acquire water than those at the tail end and are less dependent on proper maintenance of the 
channel or system. However, this problem of conflicting interests can also give impetus to users 
to organize and cooperate to assure getting at least some water for all and to prevent violent 
conflict. The same farmers along a channel who have conflicting interests over the supply they 
receive if water is scarce also have a common interest in guaranteeing that supply or in 
expanding it. Thus, forces of competition over water can be countervailed by pulls towards 
cooperation”(Uphoff 1986:38). 
 
Although it is not always easy coming to an agreement on how to share the water it seems they 
always succeed at last. A few people told me, that there used to be a lot more conflicts over 
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water in the past, before they began dividing water this way (Field data). This is a good example 
of how an institution may change over time. Evidence from other sources show that this way of 
distributing water is not unique to the two case villages but rather common for the entire Usangu 
Plains. 
“The customary way to distribute water when it is scare is by allocation of time. Water rotations 
(popularly know as zamu in the Usangu Plains) provide an interesting and successful interface 
of formal and informal institutions in water management. In the peak of dry season (September-
November), all water users come together and agree on how to share water through rotational 
arrangement (zamu). This is done without external interventions. A weekly roster is set and 
agreed upon ad each use prefecture commonly referred to as wana-zamu, i.e. the bearers of the 
rotation appoints members to make up a loose committee to oversee the water rotations. Each 
prefecture takes the rotation further to make up an intra-canal rotation” (Sokile, Mwaruvanda 
and van Koppen 2005:10).  
 
The way of dividing water according to availability is in my opinion an example of how 
customary laws adjust to ecological uncertainty. Instead of having one fixed rule concerning how 
much water each person is allowed to withdraw, they form particular agreements for specific 
situations of water availability. In addition, this illustrates that in relation to the legal pluralism 
the customary laws of the villagers are the most rooted in society and the most likely to preclude 
conflict. The formal laws may be more commanding, for example they can force the villagers to 
pay for the water rights. However, if the villagers stuck to their granted amounts of water instead 
of adjusting to the availability, more conflict were likely to occur. This way of distributing water 
can furthermore be found in other customary settings, e.g. Wolf observed the principle to 
allocate time, not water, among the Berber communities if the Atlas Mountains of Morocco 
(Wolf 2000). 
 
12.4 Sub-conclusion 
Three types of institutions have been identified; the village government, which mainly serves as 
a conflict resolution instrument, the pastoralists groups, and the irrigation groups. These groups 
are organisations in the sense that they consist of groups of individuals, but additionally they are 
characterised by complexes of rules and norms of behaviour, which form the behaviour of the 
actors and they can therefore be justified as institutions. The village government is a formal 
institution rooted in the local society and the far majority of the representatives are selected in 
the villages. However, secondary sources point out a number of weaknesses among others the 
lack of wealth and gender equality. The pastoralist groups are customary institutions created 
mainly to obtain medicine for the cattle from the government and secondary they seek to 
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improve the water availability for the cattle. The irrigation groups are both of a customary and 
formal nature. They came into being as customary groups managing traditional irrigation 
farming but with the law enforcement of water rights and water fees, they are now in the process 
of being formalised into water user associations.  
 
In addition to solving conflicts the pastoralist and irrigation groups also create cooperation. In 
particular, the irrigation groups adjust well to ecological uncertainty through their flexible 
nature. Although, the cooperation between the members does not mean that the groups are not 
conflict free, for example it is difficult to reach agreements about the division of water for 
irrigation. In addition, the groups are not power neutral in the sense that the members are not 
necessarily equal and strong gender and wealth biases may exist. Furthermore, it is my opinion 
that not all types of cooperations are ‘all inclusive’. Put in another way, some people may not be 
part of the cooperation, and thereby excluded from the rights and benefits granted the members. 
For example, I interviewed a young pastoralist who claimed not to know about the pastoralist 
group existing in his village. Unfortunately, I was not able to investigate whether this lack of 
knowledge covered over a deliberate exclusion from the group or some sort of misunderstanding.  
In addition to the three mentioned institutions, there is the domestic water institution as described 
in chapter 11.1. In spite of its invisible form it is equally important for local water management. 
 
 
 
Main forms of cooperation 
 
Type of cooperation Description 
 
The village governments Highest decision-making unit, serves as a 
conflict resolution tool 
The pastoralists groups Manage the interest of the pastoralists, solve 
conflicts between the pastoralist and to a lesser 
extent between pastoralists and other actors. 
The irrigation groups (WUAs) Solve issues of water division and matters 
concerning irrigation channels 
Invisible form of institution 
 
 
Domestic water management institution e.g. the 
norm of waiting in line 
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PART FIVE: Conclusion 
 
In order to answer the question about how customary and formal institutions are related to local 
water conflict and cooperation, I have analysed various types of conflicts and cooperation and 
the institutions linked hereto. With the analysis as a background, this chapter seeks to answer, 
“How is the relationship between water management institutions and local water conflict and 
cooperation?” 
 
Events of conflict and cooperation 
Conflicts occur within the three user groups: irrigation farmers, pastoralist and domestic users. 
For the irrigation farmers the conflicts mainly occur between upstream and downstream farmers 
when the upstream farmers are (perceived as) using too much water. The pastoralists have 
conflicts with one another when a pastoralist takes his cattle to the well of another pastoralist 
without permission. The domestic users experience disputes when a women fails to wait for her 
turn when getting water from the wells, the riverbed or the taps. As for conflicts between the user 
groups my empirical studies do not reveal any water conflicts between irrigation farmers and 
pastoralist as they have different sources of water. On the other hand, conflicts between 
pastoralists and domestic users were observed. The domestic users rely on self-dug ‘wells’ for 
water supply, but occasionally a pastoralist may take his cattle to such a well, which often ruins 
the well and make the water dirty. Consequently, the domestic users complain about this 
violation. As for conflict with groups from other villages they seem to be largely non-existent.  
 
The conflicts between the irrigation farmers occur strictly in the wet season (November-May), 
whereas the conflicts between the pastoralists and the domestic users only occur in the dry 
season (June-November). The rest of the year the pastoralists have no difficulty finding water. 
As for the conflicts between the domestic users they mainly take place during the dry season, but 
in relation to water supply from the taps fights tend to occur whenever there is water in the taps, 
as that only happens a few times per month. 
 
The large majority of the conflicts are solved between the actors. If deemed necessary, the 
offender pays a fine to the victim or reconstructs the well, in the cases where a well has suffered 
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damage. The next step is to involve some authority e.g. a secretary from an irrigation group or a 
pastoralist group, or a village government representative. The third step is to have the matter 
discussed at the village council, which according to the respondents is seldom needed. A fourth 
option would be to address the water basin office, as part of its tasks is to solve conflicts. 
However, in the two case villages this option is generally not used because they always manage 
to solve the conflicts in the villages.  
 
Water management institutions 
A network of formal water management institutions has been elaborated through the recent years 
however the villagers in the two case villages use none of these formal organs. Instead they use 
the various customary and formal institutions existing in the village. The highest ranking of these 
local institutions is the village council; this institution is mainly used for conflict resolution. The 
village council is a formal institution but deeply rooted in the local societies. Another institution, 
which is both of a formal and customary nature, is the ‘water user association’. The irrigation 
groups have a long history in Tanzania, but with the implementation of the water rights and 
water fees, the groups are gradually being formally registered as water user associations. The 
irrigation groups/water user associations are in charge of all maters concerning irrigation farming 
and during periods of scarcity they make water rotations so all farmers get water for the same 
amount of days. The implementation of the water rights and fees carried out in the 1980’ties 
implies that everyone using water for productive purposes must have a water right and pay a fee 
according to the amount of water used. The villagers are very discontent with the implementation 
of the water fee and find it unreasonable that the government is charging them for water, as 
water has always been free according to customary law. Furthermore, they claim to be unaware 
of the restrictions on the amount of water they are allowed to extract. The third institution is the 
pastoralist groups. The key motive for joining a pastoralist group is the improved access to 
medicine for the cattle. In addition, the representatives from the groups may aid conflict 
resolution and the members are saving up for a water reservoir for the cattle. The complex of 
norms of behaviour regarding domestic water management makes up a fourth type of institution. 
The institution is invisible but highly important because it regulates water management for 
household use. Waiting for one’s turn is a crucial element, as well as keeping to the maximum 
limits of water extraction.  
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Common for these institutions is that they are created by the actions, knowledge and norms of 
the actors. The rules and do’s and don’ts make up the institutions which on the other hand serve 
to regulate the behaviour of the actors. The actors are heterogeneous and have different interests, 
but the customary institutions are largely connected to separate user groups and the rules of these 
do not conflict with the rules and practices of other groups. However the actors within the groups 
are not homogenous either and biases may consist within the institutions, unfortunately I do not 
have sufficiently empirical information to make any conclusions on this matter.  
 
By and large, I find that the customary institutions are successful in solving and preventing 
conflicts. Because they are rooted in the local society and shaped by the actors they correspond 
well to the local water situations. Moreover, they are flexible and capable of adjusting to 
ecological uncertainties. The norms of behaviour are key to the customary institutions and in 
spite of occasional opportunistic behaviour they guide the actions of the users. The relatively low 
prevalence of serious water conflicts contradicts the assumption that “geographic scale and 
intensity of conflicts are inversely related” (Wolf 1998:255). On the contrary, my findings 
suggest that conflicts are generally solved efficiently between the actors or by the local 
institutions. However, due to the lack of knowledge concerning power relationships and biases it 
is up to the future to show whether these institutions are socially sustainable and continually 
capable of adjusting to water scarcity.   
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Appendix 1 - Interview guide 2 
 
1. Name  
 
2. Ethnicity 3. Age 4. Place of birth 
5. Occupation/main income source: 
         What crops: 
         How many cattle: 
6. Have you always grown these crops/always raised cattle? 
 (maybe you now grow one crop more than others)  
7. How much land do you have for cultivation?  
    How big an area per crop? 
8. Are you a member of  a WUA/irrigation/cattle/other group? 
     Why and when did you become a member? 
     Why are you not a member? 
      Do you pay a membership fee? What is that money used for? 
9. Do you have a water right? 
      If yes: When did you get it and why? 
                 How much water does it allow you to use? 
                 How much do you pay in water fee? 
                 To who do you pay the fee? 
                 What do you think about having to pay for water? 
                 What is the money that you pay in water fee used for? 
      If no: do you know what it is? Why do you not have one?    
10. From where do you get water for domestic use? 
      Can you get enough water? 
11. How does water scarcity affect you and your family? 
       For domestic use: 
       For production (crops/cattle): 
12. Has the water scarcity situation changed during the last 5 years? 
      If yes, why? 
      What will you do if there is less water in the future? 
13. Does water scarcity affect everyone equally in this village, or is there some it affects more 
than others? 
 Who + why? 
14. Do you have enough water during the wet season for crops/cattle? 
      Do you have too much water during the wet season and experience flooding? 
15. For what purpose is water scarcity the biggest problem:  
domestic use or agriculture/cattle? 
16. Can a person here personally decide what crops that person what to crow or how many cows 
to have? 
       If no: who decides? 
       What if a person comes from another place and wants to live here and use water for 
domestic   use and irrigation or cattle, what do you think about that?  
      Who does the person have to ask for permission? 
17. Have any conflicts occurred in this village about water? 
      When did it start, over what resource (tap, well, river, irrigation)  
       How did it happen, who was involved,  
       How did it end, how was it solved? 
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18. Do conflicts happen often? 
      Mostly about water for irrigation water or for domestic water? 
19. How do people share water for irrigation? 
        Are you satisfied with the way the water for irrigation is divided? (why not?) 
       When water is divided by days, how is it decided who gets water first? 
       Why do upstream people sometimes take too much water? 
       What can prevent them from doing that, is there a village law or a custom? 
        Do you work together to build the channels?  
20. Do you think it is big problem that there are so many cattle in this village?  
      Why, why not? 
21. Seasonality of conflicts? 
 
 
  
FOR CULTIVATORS: 
What happens when the wet season begins and it is time to start cultivating the rice fields in 
relation to water distribution and irrigation channels? (Do you help each other fixing the 
channels and how do you divide the water?  Do you have meetings a certain time a year about 
this?) For the irrigation division in days; how do you decide who get water when? 
 
FOR PASTORALISTS: 
Have any of the pastoralists been relocated by the government?  
Are there more of fewer cattle here today than 5 years ago, why (more people coming with cattle 
or people here raising more cattle) 
How much do you move around? It is a problem to get water when you move? Do you live 
permanently here? If you don’t live here all the time, does it affect you in relation to the rest of 
the village? Do the others think that you have the same right for water when you don’t live here 
all the time? Each pastoralist has to dig his own well in Isunura – who has decided that? 
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Appendix 2 - Functional Responsibilities for Water Resources Management 
 
Organization Functions and Responsibilities 
Minister responsible for Water • presents national policy and strategy to the Government; 
• ensures policies and strategies are implemented; 
• appoints Chairman and members of Basin Water Boards; and 
• determines appeals from all levels in framework 
Ministry responsible for Water • supervises Water Resources Institute (Agency); 
• supervises Drilling and Dam Construction Agency; 
• sectoral co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation; 
• policy development and review, including legislation and financing; 
• formulation of technical standards and WRM guidelines; 
• trans-boundary issues; 
• dam safety; 
• monitors and evaluates Basin Water Boards; 
• supervises and co-ordinates data collection and resource assessment, and 
Basin Water Boards; 
• technical standards and guidelines; 
• monitoring & evaluation of Water Boards; and 
• conflict management and Technical support to basin boards. 
National Water Board • integrates inter-sectoral planning; 
• co-ordinates basin planning and management; 
• resolves inter-sectoral / inter-basin conflicts; and 
• determines investment priorities and financing patterns. 
Basin Water Boards • data collection, processing and analysis for WRM monitoring and resource 
assessment; 
• technical aspects of trans-boundary issues in the basin; 
• co-ordinate and approve basin WRM planning / budgets; 
• approve, issue and revoke water use and discharge permits; 
• enforce water use permits and pollution control measures; 
• co-operate between sectors at the local level; 
• resolve conflicts and co-ordinate stakeholders; and 
• integration of district plans on WRM. 
Catchment / Sub-catchment 
Water Committees 
• delegated responsibilities from Basin Water Board. 
Water User Associations • manage allocation of water resources at local level; 
• manage equitable allocation of resources during drought; and 
• mediate in local disputes. 
Regional Secretariat • representation on Basin Water Boards. 
District Councils • representation on Basin Water Boards; 
• representation on Catchment Committees; 
• formulate and enforce bylaws for environmental protection and conservation 
of water sources; 
• promote efficient water utilisation and control; and 
• preparation of district plans for water resource demand. 
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Appendix 3 -Water User Associations (Irrigation groups) 
 
In Mawindi there are two WUAs and one of them is registered with the Water Basin Office in 
Rujewa.  
Twende Pamoja:  
Registered in 2004, existed since 1997. Members: 27 Membership fee: 5000 per person per year.  
It has a water right and pay 40.000 per year in water fee.  
They make agreements on how to use and share water according to the availability  
According to the secretary there is about 1 conflict per year. When this happens all the 
cultivators get together to discuss it and solve it.  
 
Nyamatwinga: 
The group has applied for registration and is now waiting, existed since 2001 
Members: 110. One time membership of 50.000 per person.  
It has a water right and pay 40.000 per year in water fee.  
The secretary of the WUA Nyamatwiga says that they always make some agreements when there 
is water scarcity.  
 
 
In Isunura there are three WUAs and they are all registered with the Water Basin Office in 
Rujewa. 
Mfeleji wa kati ‘the middle channel’: 
Registered in 2004, existed since 1984.  It has 30 members. The membership fee is 2000 per 
year. It has a water right and pay 100.000 per year in water fee. (He does not know how much 
water they are allowed to use.) 
Conflicts occur: Last year a person upstream dug a new channel and the down streamers got 
angry. The chairman talked with them and solved the problem. He told the person that he could 
not build a channel there and he had to remove it again. He didn’t have to pay a fine. 
If a conflict is very big or the same person makes a problem again they may involve the village 
leader but never the police or the WBO in Rujewa. There are about 3 conflicts a year.  
 
Iyota: 
Registered in 1996, existed since 1980. It has 76 members  
There is no membership fee according to the chairman, however one of its members said there is 
a fee of 2000 per year (Int. no 24) 
It has a water right but the water fee changes from year to year. Last year they paid 48.000 this 
year they’ll pay 78.000. According to the member we talked to: The group paid 108.000 last year 
and do not know how much to pay this year (Int. no 24) 
The chairman doesn’t know why the fee changes. He does not know how much water they are 
allowed to use. He is not happy to pay the water fee as the water they use is rainwater and the 
rainwater does not belong to the government. He does not know what the money is used for.  
 
Mjabajaba:  
The group has excited since 1998 and has 110 members. 
 
